Justin Ibarra
6bdfddac8e
* Expand timestamp_override tests * removed timestamp_override from eql sequence rules * add config entry for eql rules with beats index and t_o * add timestamp_override to missing fields
50 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
50 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/03/18"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after
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an adversary has achieved privilege escalation.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Net command via SYSTEM account"
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note = """## Config
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "2856446a-34e6-435b-9fb5-f8f040bfa7ed"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Discovery"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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(process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or
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winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and
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process.name : "whoami.exe" or
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(process.name : "net1.exe" and not process.parent.name : "net.exe")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1033"
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name = "System Owner/User Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0007"
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name = "Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
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