Files
sigma-rules/rules/integrations/cloud_defend/execution_kubeletctl_execution.toml
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Ruben Groenewoud 7c03840737 [New Rules] Misc. D4C Rules re: (un)Authenticated API Access (#5661)
* Updated kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.containers.image type of text to Keyword

* [New Rules] Misc. D4C Rules related to (un)authenticated API Access

* Apply suggestion from @Aegrah

* [New Rule] Kubelet Certificate File Access Detected via Defend for Containers

* [New Rule] Kubeletctl Execution Detected via Defend for Containers

* [New Rule] Potential Kubeletctl Execution Detected via Defend for Containers

* [New Rule] Kubernetes Potential Endpoint Permission Enumeration Attempt Detected

* [New Rule] Kubernetes Potential Endpoint Permission Enumeration Attempt by Anonymous User Detected

* [New Rule] Kubernetes Anonymous User Create/Update/Patch Pods Request

* [New Rule] Potential Cluster Enumeration via jq Detected via Defend for Containers

* Apply suggestion from @Aegrah

* Update execution_kubeletctl_execution.toml
2026-02-04 09:58:42 +01:00

85 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/02/02"
integration = ["cloud_defend"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "Defend for Containers integration was re-introduced in 9.3.0"
min_stack_version = "9.3.0"
updated_date = "2026/02/02"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule detects the execution of kubeletctl inside a container. Kubeletctl is a command-line tool that can be used to
interact with the Kubelet API directly. It allows easy access to this API, making the often undocumented Kubelet API
more accessible. It is often used to enumerate the Kubelet API or other resources inside the container, and may indicate
an attempt to move laterally within the pod.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
There is a potential for false positives when the command line arguments looked for in this rule are used for legitimate purposes,
such as debugging or troubleshooting. It is important to investigate any alerts generated by this rule to determine
if they are indicative of malicious activity or part of legitimate container activity.
""",
]
from = "now-6m"
index = ["logs-cloud_defend.process*"]
interval = "5m"
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Kubeletctl Execution Detected via Defend for Containers"
references = [
"https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/using-kubelet-client-to-attack-the-kubernetes-cluster",
"https://github.com/cyberark/kubeletctl",
]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "2572f7e0-7647-4c68-a42b-d3b1973deaae"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers",
"Domain: Container",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Execution",
"Tactic: Discovery",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (
(process.name == "kubeletctl" or process.args like "*kubeletctl*") or
(process.args in ("-s", "--server") and process.args in ("run", "portForward", "scan", "attach", "exec", "pods", "runningpods", "cri", "pid2pod"))
) and
process.interactive == true and container.id like "?*"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1613"
name = "Container and Resource Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"