Samirbous
9792d967d7
* [Rule Tuning] 5 rules * [Rule Tuning] Converted two IIS CredAccess rules to EQL * Update rules/windows/credential_access_iis_apppoolsa_pwd_appcmd.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/credential_access_iis_connectionstrings_dumping.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_zoom_child_process.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/evasion_rundll32_no_arguments.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * deleted. rule looks incompatible with endpoint * fixing units testing error * Update credential_access_iis_apppoolsa_pwd_appcmd.toml * Update rules/windows/credential_access_iis_apppoolsa_pwd_appcmd.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * desc * fixed tags duplicate * ecs_version * ecs_version * ecs_version * ecs_version * ecs_version * ecs_version * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml Co-authored-by: Brent Murphy <56412096+bm11100@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_zoom_child_process.toml Co-authored-by: Brent Murphy <56412096+bm11100@users.noreply.github.com> * Update defense_evasion_rundll32_no_arguments.toml * adjusted process args count to 1 adjusted process args count to 1 to account for winlogbeat Windows process creation events 4688 with missing cmdline value (avoid FPs). Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Brent Murphy <56412096+bm11100@users.noreply.github.com>
48 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
48 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/08/18"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2020/11/03"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server
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access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account
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password using aspnet_regiis command.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License"
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max_signals = 33
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name = "Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption"
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references = [
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"https://blog.netspi.com/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-1/",
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"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/greenbug-espionage-telco-south-asia",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "c25e9c87-95e1-4368-bfab-9fd34cf867ec"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access"]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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(process.name : "aspnet_regiis.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "aspnet_regiis.exe") and
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process.args : "connectionStrings" and process.args : "-pdf"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1003"
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name = "OS Credential Dumping"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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name = "Credential Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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