Justin Ibarra
59da2da474
* add unit tests to ensure host type and platform are included * add host.os.name 'linux' to all linux rules * add host.os.name macos to mac rules * add host.os.name to windows rules; fix linux dates * update from host.os.name to host.os.type Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
67 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML
67 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/05/11"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/02/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage
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paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous
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copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables
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and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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False-Positives (FP) should be at a minimum with this detection as PID files are meant to hold process IDs, not
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inherently be executables that spawn processes.
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""",
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]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Process Started from Process ID (PID) File"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Process Started from Process ID (PID) File
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Detection alerts from this rule indicate a process spawned from an executable masqueraded as a legitimate PID file which is very unusual and should not occur. Here are some possible avenues of investigation:
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- Examine parent and child process relationships of the new process to determine if other processes are running.
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- Examine the /var/run directory using Osquery to determine other potential PID files with unsually large file sizes, indicative of it being an executable: "SELECT f.size, f.uid, f.type, f.path from file f WHERE path like '/var/run/%%';"
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- Examine the reputation of the SHA256 hash from the PID file in a database like VirusTotal to identify additional pivots and artifacts for investigation."""
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references = [
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"https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/linux-file-masquerading-and-malicious-pids-sandfly-1-2-6-update/",
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"https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1522964028284411907",
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"https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf",
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"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "3688577a-d196-11ec-90b0-f661ea17fbce"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Execution", "BPFDoor", "Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and user.id == "0" and
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process.executable regex~ """/var/run/\w+\.(pid|lock|reboot)"""
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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