6c36d2afa3
* [Rule Tuning] [WIP] Linux DR
* Update defense_evasion_binary_copied_to_suspicious_directory.toml
* Fixed tag
* Added additional tuning
* unit test fix
* Additional tuning
* tuning
* added max signals
* Added max_signals=1 to brute force rules
* Cross-Platform Tuning
* Small fix
* new_terms conversion
* typo
* new_terms conversion
* Ransomware rule tuning
* performance tuning
* new_terms conversion for auditd_manager
* tune
* Need coffee
* kql/eql stuff
* formatting improvement
* new_terms sudo hijacking conversion
* exclusion
* Deprecations that were added last tuning
* Deprecations that were added last tuning
* Increased max timespan for brute force rules
* version bump
* added domain tag
* Two tunings
* More tuning
* Additional tuning
* updated_date bump
* query optimization
* Tuning
* Readded the exclusions for this one
* Changed int comparison
* Some tunings
* Update persistence_systemd_scheduled_timer_created.toml
* Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_ld_preload_shared_object_modif.toml
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
* [New Rule] Potential curl CVE-2023-38545 Exploitation
* Revert "[New Rule] Potential curl CVE-2023-38545 Exploitation"
This reverts commit 9c04d1b53d3d63678289f43ec0c7b617d26f1ce0.
* Update rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_non_standard_ssh_port.toml
* Update rules/linux/command_and_control_cat_network_activity.toml
* Update persistence_message_of_the_day_execution.toml
* Changed max_signals
* Revert "Merge branch 'main' into rule-tuning-ongoing-dr"
This reverts commit 1106b5d2eba1a3529eff325226d6baabfd4b0bf3, reversing
changes made to 5ff510757f25b0cb32e1ef18e9e2c34c8ec325a8.
* Revertable merge
* Update defense_evasion_ld_preload_env_variable_process_injection.toml
* File name change
---------
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 020fff3aea)
108 lines
5.4 KiB
TOML
108 lines
5.4 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2023/07/27"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/10/16"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the creation of a symbolic link to a suspicious file or location. A symbolic link is a reference to a file or
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directory that acts as a pointer or shortcut, allowing users to access the target file or directory from a different
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location in the file system. An attacker can potentially leverage symbolic links for privilege escalation by tricking a
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privileged process into following the symbolic link to a sensitive file, giving the attacker access to data or
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capabilities they would not normally have.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious Symbolic Link Created"
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "8a024633-c444-45c0-a4fe-78128d8c1ab6"
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setup = """
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This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
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### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
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Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows
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the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
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#### Prerequisite Requirements:
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- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
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- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
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#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
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- Go to the Kibana home page and click Add integrations.
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- In the query bar, search for Elastic Defend and select the integration to see more details about it.
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- Click Add Elastic Defend.
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- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
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- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either Traditional Endpoints or Cloud Workloads.
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- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
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- We suggest to select "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
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- Enter a name for the agent policy in New agent policy name. If other agent policies already exist, you can click the Existing hosts tab and select an existing policy instead.
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For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
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- Click Save and Continue.
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- To complete the integration, select Add Elastic Agent to your hosts and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
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For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
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"""
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
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event.type == "start" and process.name == "ln" and process.args in ("-s", "-sf") and
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(
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/* suspicious files */
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(process.args in ("/etc/shadow", "/etc/shadow-", "/etc/shadow~", "/etc/gshadow", "/etc/gshadow-") or
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(process.working_directory == "/etc" and process.args in ("shadow", "shadow-", "shadow~", "gshadow", "gshadow-"))) or
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/* suspicious bins */
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(process.args in ("/bin/bash", "/bin/dash", "/bin/sh", "/bin/tcsh", "/bin/csh", "/bin/zsh", "/bin/ksh", "/bin/fish") or
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(process.working_directory == "/bin" and process.args : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"))) or
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(process.args in ("/usr/bin/bash", "/usr/bin/dash", "/usr/bin/sh", "/usr/bin/tcsh", "/usr/bin/csh", "/usr/bin/zsh", "/usr/bin/ksh", "/usr/bin/fish") or
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(process.working_directory == "/usr/bin" and process.args in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish"))) or
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/* suspicious locations */
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(process.args : ("/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/cron.daily/*", "/etc/cron.hourly/*", "/etc/cron.weekly/*", "/etc/cron.monthly/*")) or
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(process.args : ("/home/*/.ssh/*", "/root/.ssh/*","/etc/sudoers.d/*", "/dev/shm/*"))
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) and
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process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and
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not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1548"
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name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1003"
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name = "OS Credential Dumping"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1003.008"
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name = "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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name = "Credential Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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