6bdfddac8e
* Expand timestamp_override tests * removed timestamp_override from eql sequence rules * add config entry for eql rules with beats index and t_o * add timestamp_override to missing fields
33 lines
1.2 KiB
TOML
33 lines
1.2 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/15"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies process execution with a single character process name. This is often done by adversaries while staging or
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executing temporary utilities.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious Execution - Short Program Name"
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note = """## Config
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "17c7f6a5-5bc9-4e1f-92bf-13632d24384d"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and length(process.name) > 0 and
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length(process.name) == 5 and host.os.name == "Windows" and length(process.pe.original_file_name) > 5
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'''
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