Mika Ayenson
a52751494e
* Convert config header to setup in note field * Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm * only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
55 lines
2.1 KiB
TOML
55 lines
2.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/01/07"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/07/06"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = "Identifies the execution of a shell process with suspicious arguments which may be indicative of reverse shell activity."
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential Reverse Shell Activity via Terminal"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md",
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"https://github.com/WangYihang/Reverse-Shell-Manager",
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"https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/understanding-reverse-shells/",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "a1a0375f-22c2-48c0-81a4-7c2d11cc6856"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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process.name in ("sh", "bash", "zsh", "dash", "zmodload") and
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process.args : ("*/dev/tcp/*", "*/dev/udp/*", "*zsh/net/tcp*", "*zsh/net/udp*") and
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/* noisy FPs */
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not (process.parent.name : "timeout" and process.executable : "/var/lib/docker/overlay*") and
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not process.command_line : ("*/dev/tcp/sirh_db/*", "*/dev/tcp/remoteiot.com/*", "*dev/tcp/elk.stag.one/*", "*dev/tcp/kafka/*", "*/dev/tcp/$0/$1*", "*/dev/tcp/127.*", "*/dev/udp/127.*", "*/dev/tcp/localhost/*") and
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not process.parent.command_line : "runc init"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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