Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml
T
Samirbous e1205cb5c5 [New/Tuning] Windows Rules to detect top threats/TTPs 24/25 (#5001)
* [New/Tuning] Windows Top Threats 2024/2025

1) MSHTA:
- tuning to exclude FPs
- new rule `Remote Script via Microsoft HTML Application` compatible with 3d party EDR/sysmon/system/winlog integration and that does not require correlation or multiple type of events.

2) MSIEXEC:

* Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml

* Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml

* Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml

* Create defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml

* Update defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml

* ++

* Create execution_scripting_remote_webdav.toml

* Create execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml

* Create command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml

* Update command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml

* ++

* Update execution_jscript_fake_updates.toml

* Create command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

* ++

* Create command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml

* Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml

* Update execution_scripts_archive_file.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* ++

* Create execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml

* Update execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml

* Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml

* Fix unit test errors

* Update defense_evasion_network_connection_from_windows_binary.toml

* Add system index

* Add tag

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

* Remove duplicate

* Update defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Create credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml

* Update credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml

* ++

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

* Update execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml

---------

Co-authored-by: eric-forte-elastic <eric.forte@elastic.co>
Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-09-01 15:41:51 +01:00

106 lines
4.6 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/08/20"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/08/20"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies DNS queries to commonly abused Top Level Domains by common LOLBINs or executable running from world writable
directories or unsigned binaries. This behavior matches on common malware C2 abusing less formal domain names.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"endgame-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.network-*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
"winlogbeat-*"
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Network Activity to a Suspicious Top Level Domain"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating Network Activity to a Suspicious Top Level Domain
#### Possible investigation steps
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes or malicious scripts.
- Review if the domain reputation and the frequency of network activities as well as any download/upload activity.
- Verify if the executed process is persistent on the host like common mechanisms Startup folder, task or Run key.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Extract this communication's indicators of compromise (IoCs) and use traffic logs to search for other potentially compromised hosts.
### False positive analysis
- Trusted domain from an expected process running in the environment.
### Response and remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Implement any temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation required to contain the attack.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Update firewall rules to be more restrictive.
- Reimage the host operating system or restore the compromised files to clean versions.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
"""
references = ["https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/top-20-tlds-by-malicious-phishing-domains"]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "e516bf56-d51b-43e8-91ec-9e276331f433"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Command and Control",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: Sysmon",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
network where host.os.type == "windows" and dns.question.name != null and
(
process.name : ("MSBuild.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "msiexec.exe", "rundll32.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe", "InstallUtil.exe", "python.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "dllhost.exe", "node.exe",
"java.exe", "javaw.exe", "*.pif", "*.com", "*.scr") or
?process.code_signature.trusted != true or
?process.code_signature.subject_name : ("AutoIt Consulting Ltd", "OpenJS Foundation", "Python Software Foundation") or
process.executable : ("?:\\Users\\*.exe", "", "?:\\ProgramData\\*.exe")
) and
dns.question.name regex """.*\.(top|buzz|xyz|rest|ml|cf|gq|ga|onion|monster|cyou|quest|cc|bar|cfd|click|cam|surf|tk|shop|club|icu|pw|ws|online|fun|life|boats|store|hair|skin|motorcycles|christmas|lol|makeup|mom|bond|beauty|biz|live|work|zip|country|accountant|date|party|science|loan|win|men|faith|review|racing|download|host)"""
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1071.004"
name = "DNS"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"