Jonhnathan
fd3d2708a1
* Initial Review of Sysmon Registry Rules
* Update defense_evasion_sip_provider_mod.toml
(cherry picked from commit 9bbe26fec0)
53 lines
1.6 KiB
TOML
53 lines
1.6 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/01/19"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/02/14"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Windows operating systems are utilizing the time provider architecture in order to obtain accurate time stamps from
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other network devices or clients in the network. Time providers are implemented in the form of a DLL file which resides
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in System32 folder. The service W32Time initiates during the startup of Windows and loads w32time.dll. Adversaries may
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abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time
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provider.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential Persistence via Time Provider Modification"
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references = ["https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/"]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "14ed1aa9-ebfd-4cf9-a463-0ac59ec55204"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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registry where event.type:"change" and
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registry.path:"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\*" and
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registry.data.strings:"*.dll"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1547"
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name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1547.003"
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name = "Time Providers"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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