Ruben Groenewoud
a1716bd673
* [Rule Tuning] Several rule tunings * Added 1 more * optimized ransomware encryption rules * Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_file_encryption.toml * Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_note_detected.toml * Added 2 more tunings based on todays telemetry * Some tunings * Tuning * Tuning * fixed user.id comparison * Something went wrong with deprecation * Something went wrong with deprecation * Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_file_encryption.toml * Update rules/linux/discovery_linux_nping_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/linux/discovery_linux_hping_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Dedeprecated the rule to deprecate later --------- Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
113 lines
3.6 KiB
TOML
113 lines
3.6 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/07/22"
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/08/24"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Detects the manual creation of files in specific etc directories, via user root, used by Linux malware to persist and
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elevate privileges on compromised systems. File creation in these directories should not be entirely common and could
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indicate a malicious binary or script installing persistence mechanisms for long term access.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence"
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references = [
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"https://www.intezer.com/blog/incident-response/orbit-new-undetected-linux-threat/",
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"https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/lightning-framework-new-linux-threat/"
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Threat: Orbit", "Threat: Lightning Framework", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type in ("creation", "file_create_event") and user.name == "root" and
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file.path : ("/etc/ld.so.conf.d/*", "/etc/cron.d/*", "/etc/sudoers.d/*", "/etc/rc.d/init.d/*", "/etc/systemd/system/*",
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"/usr/lib/systemd/system/*") and not process.executable : ("*/dpkg", "*/yum", "*/apt", "*/dnf", "*/rpm", "*/systemd",
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"*/snapd", "*/dnf-automatic","*/yum-cron", "*/elastic-agent", "*/dnfdaemon-system", "*/bin/dockerd", "*/sbin/dockerd",
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"/kaniko/executor", "/usr/sbin/rhn_check") and not file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "tmp")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1037"
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name = "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1037.004"
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name = "RC Scripts"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1574"
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name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1574.006"
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name = "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1543"
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name = "Create or Modify System Process"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1543.002"
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name = "Systemd Service"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1053"
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name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1053.003"
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name = "Cron"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1548"
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name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1548.003"
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name = "Sudo and Sudo Caching"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/"
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