shashank-elastic
87 lines
2.9 KiB
TOML
87 lines
2.9 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/10/18"
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integration = ["system", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2024/05/21"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account
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passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials.
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"""
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false_positives = ["Legitimate remote account administration."]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Account Password Reset Remotely"
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note = """
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## Performance
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This rule may cause medium to high performance impact due to logic scoping all remote Windows logon activity.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724",
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"https://stealthbits.com/blog/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz/",
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"https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Credential%20Access/remote_pwd_reset_rpc_mimikatz_postzerologon_target_DC.evtx",
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"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "2820c9c2-bcd7-4d6e-9eba-faf3891ba450"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = [
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"Domain: Endpoint",
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"OS: Windows",
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"Use Case: Threat Detection",
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"Tactic: Persistence",
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"Tactic: Impact",
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]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m
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[authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and
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/* event 4624 need to be logged */
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winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and
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source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and
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not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName : ("svc*", "PIM_*", "_*_", "*-*-*", "*$")] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
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/* event 4724 need to be logged */
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[iam where event.action == "reset-password" and
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(
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/*
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This rule is very noisy if not scoped to privileged accounts, duplicate the
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rule and add your own naming convention and accounts of interest here.
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*/
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winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: ("*Admin*", "*super*", "*SVC*", "*DC0*", "*service*", "*DMZ*", "*ADM*") or
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winlog.event_data.TargetSid : ("S-1-5-21-*-500", "S-1-12-1-*-500")
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)
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] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1098"
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name = "Account Manipulation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1531"
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name = "Account Access Removal"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0040"
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name = "Impact"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
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