Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/credential_access_domain_backup_dpapi_private_keys.toml
T
Jonhnathan 54d5b442cf [Rule Tuning] Add Initial Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Compatibility to Windows DRs (#3825)
* [Rule Tuning] Add Initial Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Compatibility to Windows DRs

* .

* Update integration-schemas.json.gz

* Fix integration manifests
2024-06-26 11:06:27 -03:00

71 lines
2.9 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/08/13"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
updated_date = "2024/06/25"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the creation or modification of Domain Backup private keys. Adversaries may extract the Data Protection API
(DPAPI) domain backup key from a Domain Controller (DC) to be able to decrypt any domain user master key file.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key"
note = """## Triage and analysis
Domain DPAPI Backup keys are stored on domain controllers and can be dumped remotely with tools such as Mimikatz. The resulting .pvk private key can be used to decrypt ANY domain user masterkeys, which then can be used to decrypt any secrets protected by those keys.
"""
references = [
"https://www.dsinternals.com/en/retrieving-dpapi-backup-keys-from-active-directory/",
"https://posts.specterops.io/operational-guidance-for-offensive-user-dpapi-abuse-1fb7fac8b107",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "b83a7e96-2eb3-4edf-8346-427b6858d3bd"
setup = """## Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
"""
severity = "high"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Data Source: Sysmon", "Data Source: SentinelOne", "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and file.name : ("ntds_capi_*.pfx", "ntds_capi_*.pvk")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1552"
name = "Unsecured Credentials"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1552.004"
name = "Private Keys"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1555"
name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"