9ff3873ee7
* [rule-tuning] Adding more context with triage/investigation * Adding mimikatz rule * Fixed updated date on mimikatz rule * Adding Defender update * Adding scheduled task * Adding AdFind * Adding rare process * Adding cloudtrail country * Adding cloudtrail spike * Adding threat intel * Fixed minor spelling/syntax * Fixed minor spelling/syntax p2 * Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_module_match.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * Removed MITRE link, added Microsoft * Update ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml * Update ml_cloudtrail_rare_method_by_country.toml * Update ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml * Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml * Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml * Update discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml * Update lateral_movement_dns_server_overflow.toml * Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml * Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml * Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml * Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml * Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
93 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
93 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/03/15"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2021/09/10"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default Startup directory in order to bypass
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detections monitoring file creation in the Windows Startup folder.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Suspicious Startup Shell Activity
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Techniques used within malware and by adversaries often leverage the Windows registry to store malicious programs for
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persistence. Startup shell folders are often targeted as they are not as prevalent as normal Startup folder paths so this
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behavior may evade existing AV/EDR solutions. Another preference is that these programs might run with higher privileges
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which can be ideal for an attacker.
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#### Possible investigation steps:
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- Review the source process and related file tied to the Windows Registry entry
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- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity or legitimate software
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installations
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- Determine if activity is unique by validating if other machines in same organization have similar entry
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### False Positive Analysis
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- There is a high possibility of benign legitimate programs being added to Shell folders. This activity could be based
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on new software installations, patches, or any kind of network administrator related activity. Before entering further
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investigation, this activity should be validated that is it not related to benign activity
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### Related Rules
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- Startup or Run Key Registry Modification
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- Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory
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### Response and Remediation
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- Activity should first be validated as a true positive event if so then immediate response should be taken to review,
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investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further post-compromise behavior
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- The respective binary or program tied to this persistence method should be further analyzed and reviewed to understand
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it's behavior and capabilities
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- Since this activity is considered post-exploitation behavior, it's important to understand how the behavior was first
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initialized such as through a macro-enabled document that was attached in a phishing email. By understanding the source
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of the attack, this information can then be used to search for similar indicators on other machines in the same environment.
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"""
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "c8b150f0-0164-475b-a75e-74b47800a9ff"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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registry where
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registry.path : (
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"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
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"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup",
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"HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup",
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"HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup"
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) and
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registry.data.strings != null and
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/* Normal Startup Folder Paths */
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not registry.data.strings : (
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"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
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"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
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"%USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup",
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"C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup"
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)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1547"
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name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1547.001"
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name = "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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