Files
sigma-rules/rules_building_block/discovery_system_service_discovery.toml
T
Samirbous f9ba8a8f71 [Tuning] Top Noisy Windows BBR (#5480)
* [Tuning] Top Noisy Windows BBRS

- Process Discovery Using Built-in Tools
- System Service Discovery through built-in Windows Utilities

* Update discovery_generic_process_discovery.toml

* Update discovery_generic_process_discovery.toml

* Update discovery_generic_process_discovery.toml

* Update discovery_generic_process_discovery.toml

---------

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-12-18 16:01:58 +00:00

84 lines
3.3 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
bypass_bbr_timing = true
creation_date = "2023/01/24"
integration = ["windows", "endpoint", "system"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/12/17"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Detects the usage of commonly used system service discovery techniques, which attackers may use during the
reconnaissance phase after compromising a system in order to gain a better understanding of the environment and/or
escalate privileges.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"endgame-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
"logs-system.security*",
"logs-windows.*",
"winlogbeat-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "System Service Discovery through built-in Windows Utilities"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "e0881d20-54ac-457f-8733-fe0bc5d44c55"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Rule Type: BBR",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.parent.executable != null and
(
((process.name: "net.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "net.exe" or (process.name : "net1.exe" and
not process.parent.name : "net.exe")) and process.args : ("start", "use") and process.args_count == 2 and
not process.parent.args : ("*.bat", "*netlogon*", "\\\\*")) or
((process.name: "sc.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "sc.exe") and process.args: ("query", "q*") and not process.parent.args : "*.bat") or
((process.name: "tasklist.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "tasklist.exe") and process.args: "/svc" and not process.command_line : "*\\Windows\\TEMP\\nessus_task_list*") or
(process.name : "psservice.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "psservice.exe")
) and
not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
not process.parent.executable in
("C:\\Program Files\\AzureConnectedMachineAgent\\himds.exe",
"C:\\Program Files\\AzureConnectedMachineAgent\\azcmagent.exe",
"C:\\Program Files\\Varian\\DICOMServices\\VMS.DICOMServices.ServiceFW.GenericControlledServiceHost.exe",
"C:\\Senior\\HCM\\jdk-11.0.2\\bin\\java.exe",
"D:\\biomerieux\\programs\\ServiceMonitor\\bin\\MylaServiceMonitor.exe",
"C:\\ViewPowerPro\\openJDK\\bin\\javaw.exe",
"C:\\ServiceNow MID Server mid-server-autosports-prod\\agent\\jre\\bin\\java.exe") and
not process.command_line in ("sc queryex SCardSvr",
"sc query \"Axway_Integrator\" ",
"sc query \"Delta enteliVAULT PostgreSQL\" ",
"sc query \"WERMA-WIN-Connector\" ",
"sc query _EWSSynchronizationServer_JDE ",
"sc query SchneiderUPSMySQL")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1007"
name = "System Service Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"