Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml
T
Samirbous e1205cb5c5 [New/Tuning] Windows Rules to detect top threats/TTPs 24/25 (#5001)
* [New/Tuning] Windows Top Threats 2024/2025

1) MSHTA:
- tuning to exclude FPs
- new rule `Remote Script via Microsoft HTML Application` compatible with 3d party EDR/sysmon/system/winlog integration and that does not require correlation or multiple type of events.

2) MSIEXEC:

* Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml

* Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml

* Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml

* Create defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml

* Update defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml

* ++

* Create execution_scripting_remote_webdav.toml

* Create execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml

* Create command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml

* Update command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml

* ++

* Update execution_jscript_fake_updates.toml

* Create command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

* ++

* Create command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml

* Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml

* Update execution_scripts_archive_file.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* ++

* Create execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml

* Update execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml

* Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml

* Fix unit test errors

* Update defense_evasion_network_connection_from_windows_binary.toml

* Add system index

* Add tag

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

* Remove duplicate

* Update defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Create credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml

* Update credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml

* ++

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

* Update execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml

* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml

---------

Co-authored-by: eric-forte-elastic <eric.forte@elastic.co>
Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-09-01 15:41:51 +01:00

112 lines
5.9 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/08/19"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/08/19"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies Mshta.exe spawning a suspicious child process. This may indicate adversarial activity, as Mshta is often
leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts and evade detection.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"endgame-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
"logs-m365_defender.event-*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-system.security*",
"logs-windows.forwarded*",
"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
"winlogbeat-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Microsoft HTML Application Child Process"
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Suspicious Microsoft HTML Application Child Process
Mshta.exe is a legitimate Windows utility used to execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files. Adversaries exploit it to run malicious scripts, leveraging its trusted status to bypass security measures. The detection rule identifies suspicious network activity by Mshta.exe, excluding known benign processes, to flag potential threats. This approach helps in identifying unauthorized network connections indicative of malicious intent.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the process tree to understand the parent-child relationship of mshta.exe, focusing on any unusual or unexpected parent processes that are not excluded by the rule, such as Microsoft.ConfigurationManagement.exe or known benign executables.
- Analyze the command-line arguments used by mshta.exe to identify any suspicious or unexpected scripts being executed, especially those not matching the excluded ADSelfService_Enroll.hta.
- Examine the network connections initiated by mshta.exe, including destination IP addresses, domains, and ports, to identify any connections to known malicious or suspicious endpoints.
- Check for any related alerts or logs from the same host around the time of the mshta.exe activity to identify potential lateral movement or additional malicious behavior.
- Investigate the user account associated with the mshta.exe process to determine if it has been compromised or is exhibiting unusual activity patterns.
### False positive analysis
- Mshta.exe may be triggered by legitimate software updates or installations, such as those from Microsoft Configuration Management. To handle this, add exceptions for processes with parent names like Microsoft.ConfigurationManagement.exe.
- Certain applications like Amazon Assistant and TeamViewer may use Mshta.exe for legitimate purposes. Exclude these by specifying their executable paths, such as C:\\Amazon\\Amazon Assistant\\amazonAssistantService.exe and C:\\TeamViewer\\TeamViewer.exe.
- Custom scripts or internal tools that utilize HTA files for automation might cause false positives. Identify these scripts and exclude them by their specific arguments, such as ADSelfService_Enroll.hta.
- Regularly review and update the list of exceptions to ensure that only verified benign activities are excluded, minimizing the risk of overlooking genuine threats.
### Response and remediation
- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
- Terminate the mshta.exe process if it is confirmed to be making unauthorized network connections.
- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using updated antivirus and anti-malware tools to identify and remove any malicious scripts or files.
- Review and analyze the process tree and network connections associated with mshta.exe to identify any additional compromised processes or systems.
- Restore the system from a known good backup if malicious activity is confirmed and cannot be fully remediated.
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution of mshta.exe and similar system binaries.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network."""
references = [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "48e60a73-08e8-42aa-8f51-4ed92c64dbea"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
"Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
"Data Source: Sysmon",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.parent.name : "mshta.exe" and
(
process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "curl.exe", "msiexec.exe", "schtasks.exe", "reg.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe") or
process.executable : ("C:\\Users\\*\\*.exe", "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Users\\*\\*.exe")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.005"
name = "Mshta"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"