Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/persistence_services_registry.toml
T
Terrance DeJesus 4312d8c958 [FR] Add Endpoint, APM and Windows Integration Tags to Rules and Supportability (#2429)
* initial commit

* addressing flake errors

* added apm to _get_packagted_integrations logic

* addressed flake errors

* adjusted integration schema and updated rules to be a list

* updated several rules and removed a unit test

* updated rules with logs-* only index patterns

* Update tests/test_all_rules.py

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

* addressed flake errors

* integration is none is windows, endpoint or apm

* adding rules with accepted incoming changes from main

* fixed tag and tactic alignment errors from unit testing

* adjusted unit testing logic for integration tags; added more exclusion rules

* adjusted test_integration logic to be rule resistent and skip if -8.3

* adjusted comments for unit test skip

* fixed merge conflicts from main

* changing test_integration_tag to remove logic for rule version comparisons

* added integration tag to new rule

* adjusted rules updated_date value

* ignore guided onboarding rule in unit tests

* added integration tag to new rule

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-01-04 09:30:07 -05:00

64 lines
2.3 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/11/18"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2022/12/14"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of through the expected Windows APIs. This
could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist through abnormal service creation or
modification of an existing service.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual Persistence via Services Registry"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "403ef0d3-8259-40c9-a5b6-d48354712e49"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
registry where registry.path : ("HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ServiceDLL", "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath") and
not registry.data.strings : ("?:\\windows\\system32\\Drivers\\*.sys",
"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\*.sys",
"\\??\\?:\\Windows\\system32\\Drivers\\*.SYS",
"system32\\DRIVERS\\USBSTOR") and
not (process.name : "procexp??.exe" and registry.data.strings : "?:\\*\\procexp*.sys") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\winsxs\\*\\TiWorker.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\drvinst.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1543.003"
name = "Windows Service"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"