Terrance DeJesus
4312d8c958
* initial commit * addressing flake errors * added apm to _get_packagted_integrations logic * addressed flake errors * adjusted integration schema and updated rules to be a list * updated several rules and removed a unit test * updated rules with logs-* only index patterns * Update tests/test_all_rules.py Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> * addressed flake errors * integration is none is windows, endpoint or apm * adding rules with accepted incoming changes from main * fixed tag and tactic alignment errors from unit testing * adjusted unit testing logic for integration tags; added more exclusion rules * adjusted test_integration logic to be rule resistent and skip if -8.3 * adjusted comments for unit test skip * fixed merge conflicts from main * changing test_integration_tag to remove logic for rule version comparisons * added integration tag to new rule * adjusted rules updated_date value * ignore guided onboarding rule in unit tests * added integration tag to new rule Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
87 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
87 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/09/01"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2022/12/14"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating
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privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid credentials. They may
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utilize these to move laterally undetected and access additional resources.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities"
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references = ["https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/"]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "9a3a3689-8ed1-4cdb-83fb-9506db54c61f"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Privilege Escalation", "Credential Access"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and user.name == "root"
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and (process.args : "/etc/shadow" or (process.working_directory: "/etc" and process.args: "shadow"))
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and not process.executable:
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("/usr/bin/tar",
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"/bin/tar",
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"/usr/bin/gzip",
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"/bin/gzip",
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"/usr/bin/zip",
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"/bin/zip",
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"/usr/bin/stat",
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"/bin/stat",
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"/usr/bin/cmp",
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"/bin/cmp",
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"/usr/bin/sudo",
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"/bin/sudo",
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"/usr/bin/find",
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"/bin/find",
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"/usr/bin/ls",
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"/bin/ls",
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"/usr/bin/uniq",
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"/bin/uniq",
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"/usr/bin/unzip",
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"/bin/unzip")
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and not process.parent.executable: "/bin/dracut"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1068"
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name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1003"
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name = "OS Credential Dumping"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1003.008"
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name = "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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name = "Credential Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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