Jonhnathan
3a5fceac3b
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 3 * Adjust Investigation Guides and Config * Adjust Config Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com>
110 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
110 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/03/01"
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "The field `file.Ext.header_bytes` was not introduced until 7.15"
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min_stack_version = "7.15.0"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies remote access to the registry to potentially dump credential data from the SAM registry hive in preparation
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for credential access and privileges elevation.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry
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Dumping registry hives is a common way to access credential information. Some hives store credential material,
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such as the SAM hive, which stores locally cached credentials (SAM Secrets), and the SECURITY hive, which stores domain
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cached credentials (LSA secrets). Dumping these hives in combination with the SYSTEM hive enables the attacker to
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decrypt these secrets.
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Attackers can use tools like secretsdump.py or CrackMapExec to dump the registry hives remotely, and use dumped
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credentials to access other systems in the domain.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Identify the target host role, involved account, and source host.
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- Determine the privileges assigned to any compromised accounts.
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- Investigate other alerts related to the involved user and source host in the last 48 hours.
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- Scope potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (e.g., 4624) to the target
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host.
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### False positive analysis
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- False positives for this rule are unlikely. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must
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be monitored by the security team.
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### Related rules
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- Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping - a7e7bfa3-088e-4f13-b29e-3986e0e756b8
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- Scope compromised credentials and disable the accounts.
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- Reset the passwords of compromised accounts.
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- Determine if other hosts were compromised.
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## Config
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This rule uses Elastic Endpoint file creation and System Integration events for correlation. Both data should be
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collected from the host for this detection to work.
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = ["https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py"]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "850d901a-2a3c-46c6-8b22-55398a01aad8"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Lateral Movement", "Credential Access"]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=1m
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[authentication where
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event.outcome == "success" and
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winlog.logon.type == "Network" and not user.name == "ANONYMOUS LOGON" and
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not user.domain == "NT AUTHORITY" and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip !="::1"]
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[file where event.action == "creation" and process.name : "svchost.exe" and
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file.Ext.header_bytes : "72656766*" and user.id : "S-1-5-21-*" and file.size >= 30000]
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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name = "OS Credential Dumping"
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id = "T1003"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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name = "Security Account Manager"
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id = "T1003.002"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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name = "Credential Access"
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id = "TA0006"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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name = "Remote Services"
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id = "T1021"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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name = "Lateral Movement"
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id = "TA0008"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
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