Mika Ayenson
62298d92f4
* Convert config header to setup in note field
* Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm
* only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable
Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
Removed changes from:
- rules/cross-platform/impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_policy_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_admin_role_assigned_to_user.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_api_access_granted_via_domain_wide_delegation_of_authority.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_role_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/kubernetes/execution_user_exec_to_pod.toml
- rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_adding_the_hidden_file_attribute_with_via_attribexe.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_certutil_commands.toml
- rules/windows/execution_command_shell_started_by_svchost.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit a52751494e)
89 lines
3.8 KiB
TOML
89 lines
3.8 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/02"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/04/21"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies use of the Windows file system utility (fsutil.exe) to gather information about attached peripheral devices
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and components connected to a computer system.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Peripheral Device Discovery"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Peripheral Device Discovery
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After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps.
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This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security
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software.
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This rule looks for the execution of the `fsutil` utility with the `fsinfo` subcommand to enumerate drives attached to
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the computer, which can be used to identify secondary drives used for backups, mapped network drives, and removable
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media. These devices can contain valuable information for attackers.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files
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for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
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- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
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- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
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- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed using the account, such as commands executed, files created or modified, and
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network connections.
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- Determine whether this activity was followed by suspicious file access/copy operations or uploads to file storage
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services.
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### False positive analysis
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- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify
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suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are
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identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business
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systems, and web services.
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- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and
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malware components.
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- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
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- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the
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mean time to respond (MTTR).
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## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "0c7ca5c2-728d-4ad9-b1c5-bbba83ecb1f4"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Discovery"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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(process.name : "fsutil.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "fsutil.exe") and
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process.args : "fsinfo" and process.args : "drives"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1120"
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name = "Peripheral Device Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0007"
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name = "Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
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