Ruben Groenewoud
020fff3aea
* [Rule Tuning] [WIP] Linux DR * Update defense_evasion_binary_copied_to_suspicious_directory.toml * Fixed tag * Added additional tuning * unit test fix * Additional tuning * tuning * added max signals * Added max_signals=1 to brute force rules * Cross-Platform Tuning * Small fix * new_terms conversion * typo * new_terms conversion * Ransomware rule tuning * performance tuning * new_terms conversion for auditd_manager * tune * Need coffee * kql/eql stuff * formatting improvement * new_terms sudo hijacking conversion * exclusion * Deprecations that were added last tuning * Deprecations that were added last tuning * Increased max timespan for brute force rules * version bump * added domain tag * Two tunings * More tuning * Additional tuning * updated_date bump * query optimization * Tuning * Readded the exclusions for this one * Changed int comparison * Some tunings * Update persistence_systemd_scheduled_timer_created.toml * Update rules/linux/privilege_escalation_ld_preload_shared_object_modif.toml Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com> * [New Rule] Potential curl CVE-2023-38545 Exploitation * Revert "[New Rule] Potential curl CVE-2023-38545 Exploitation" This reverts commit 9c04d1b53d3d63678289f43ec0c7b617d26f1ce0. * Update rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_non_standard_ssh_port.toml * Update rules/linux/command_and_control_cat_network_activity.toml * Update persistence_message_of_the_day_execution.toml * Changed max_signals * Revert "Merge branch 'main' into rule-tuning-ongoing-dr" This reverts commit 1106b5d2eba1a3529eff325226d6baabfd4b0bf3, reversing changes made to 5ff510757f25b0cb32e1ef18e9e2c34c8ec325a8. * Revertable merge * Update defense_evasion_ld_preload_env_variable_process_injection.toml * File name change --------- Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
52 lines
1.7 KiB
TOML
52 lines
1.7 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2023/08/30"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/09/13"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule monitors for the usage of the which command with an unusual amount of process arguments. Attackers may leverage
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the which command to enumerate the system for useful installed utilities that may be used after compromising a system to
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escalate privileges or move latteraly across the network.
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"""
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from = "now-119m"
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interval = "60m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious which Enumeration"
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "5b18eef4-842c-4b47-970f-f08d24004bde"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Discovery", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Rule Type: BBR"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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building_block_type = "default"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name == "which" and process.args_count >= 10
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/* potential tuning if rule would turn out to be noisy
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and process.args in ("nmap", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", nc.traditional", "gcc", "g++", "socat") and
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process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "ash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")
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*/
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1082"
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name = "System Information Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0007"
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name = "Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
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