[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/01/09"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects when the Ollama LLM server accepts connections from external IP addresses. Ollama lacks built-in authentication,
so exposed instances allow unauthenticated model theft, prompt injection, and resource hijacking.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Ollama API Accessed from External Network"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Ollama API Accessed from External Network

This rule detects when Ollama accepts connections from external IP addresses. Ollama binds to localhost:11434 by default but can be exposed via OLLAMA_HOST. Since Ollama lacks authentication, exposed instances allow unauthenticated model theft, prompt injection, and resource hijacking.

### Possible investigation steps

- Check the OLLAMA_HOST environment variable to determine if external exposure was intentional.
- Review the source IP address to identify if it's a known attacker, scanner, or miscategorized internal system.
- Examine Ollama logs for suspicious API calls to /api/pull, /api/push, or /api/generate.
- Check ~/.ollama/models/ for unexpected model downloads that may indicate model poisoning.
- Review network traffic for data exfiltration following the connection.
- Look for child processes spawned by Ollama that may indicate exploitation.

### False positive analysis

- Internal networks not properly classified in CIDR ranges may trigger false positives.
- Load balancers or reverse proxies accessing Ollama from external-facing IPs within trusted infrastructure.
- Legitimate remote access through VPN or authenticated proxy (add proxy IPs to exclusions).

### Response and remediation

- Restrict access immediately by setting OLLAMA_HOST=127.0.0.1:11434 or applying firewall rules.
- If exploitation is suspected, stop Ollama and audit ~/.ollama/models/ for unauthorized models.
- Review Ollama and system logs for signs of compromise.
- Consider running Ollama in a container with network isolation.
"""
references = [
    "https://www.greynoise.io/blog/threat-actors-actively-targeting-llms",
    "https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0040",
    "https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0044",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "d8f2a1b3-c4e5-6789-abcd-ef0123456789"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Endpoint",
    "OS: Linux",
    "OS: macOS",
    "OS: Windows",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Initial Access",
    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
    "Domain: LLM",
    "Mitre Atlas: T0040",
    "Mitre Atlas: T0044",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
network where event.action == "connection_accepted" and
  process.name in ("ollama", "ollama.exe") and
  destination.port == 11434 and
  source.ip != null and source.ip != "0.0.0.0" and
  not cidrmatch(source.ip, 
    "10.0.0.0/8", 
    "127.0.0.0/8", 
    "169.254.0.0/16", 
    "172.16.0.0/12", 
    "192.168.0.0/16",
    "100.64.0.0/10",
    "::1",
    "fe80::/10",
    "fc00::/7",
    "ff00::/8"
  )
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1133"
name = "External Remote Services"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1190"
name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"