[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/12/15"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2021/10/17"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by an outbound RPC network connection
within a short time period. This may indicate lateral movement or remote discovery via scheduled tasks.
"""
false_positives = ["Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software."]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell"
references = [
    "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "5cd55388-a19c-47c7-8ec4-f41656c2fded"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
type = "eql"

query = '''
sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s
 [library where dll.name : "taskschd.dll" and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")]
 [network where process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and destination.port == 135 and not destination.address in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")]
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1053"
name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"

  [[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
  id = "T1053.005"
  name = "Scheduled Task"
  reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"