[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/01/19"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2022/03/31"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies suspicious child processes of the Java interpreter process. This may indicate an attempt to execute a
malicious JAR file or an exploitation attempt via a JAVA specific vulnerability.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious JAVA Child Process"
note = """## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
references = [
    "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/",
    "https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app",
    "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "8acb7614-1d92-4359-bfcf-478b6d9de150"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
  process.parent.name : "java" and
  process.name : ("sh", "bash", "dash", "ksh", "tcsh", "zsh", "curl", "wget")
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"