[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/10/02"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: process.Ext.effective_parent.executable, process.Ext.effective_parent.name, process.Ext.relative_file_creation_time, process.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time"
min_stack_version = "8.4.0"
updated_date = "2023/10/02"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the creation of a process impersonating the token of another user logon session. Adversaries may create a new
process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Process Created with a Duplicated Token"
references = [
    "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createprocesswithtokenw",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "1b0b4818-5655-409b-9c73-341cac4bb73f"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */

process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and

 user.id : ("S-1-5-21-*", "S-1-12-1-*") and

 (process.Ext.effective_parent.executable regex~ """[C-Z]:\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64)\\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_\.]+\.exe""" or
  process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe") and

 (
  process.name : ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "rundll32.exe", "notepad.exe", "net.exe", "ntdsutil.exe",
                  "tasklist.exe", "reg.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "msbuild.exe", "esentutl.exe") or

  ((process.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 900 or process.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time <= 900) and
   not process.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*") and
   not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*"))
 ) and
 not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
      process.command_line : ("*davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie*", "*?:\\Program Files*",
                              "*\\Windows\\System32\\winethc.dll*", "*\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\EDGEHTML.dll*",
                              "*shell32.dll,SHCreateLocalServerRunDll*")) and
 not startswith~(process.Ext.effective_parent.name, process.parent.name)
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1134"
name = "Access Token Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1134.001"
name = "Token Impersonation/Theft"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1134.002"
name = "Create Process with Token"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"