[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/10/18"
integration = ["system", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/12/14"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account
passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials.
"""
false_positives = ["Legitimate remote account administration."]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Account Password Reset Remotely"
note = "This rule may cause medium to high performance impact due to logic scoping all remote Windows logon activity."
references = [
    "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724",
    "https://stealthbits.com/blog/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz/",
    "https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Credential%20Access/remote_pwd_reset_rpc_mimikatz_postzerologon_target_DC.evtx",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "2820c9c2-bcd7-4d6e-9eba-faf3891ba450"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Tactic: Impact"]
type = "eql"

query = '''
sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m
  [authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and
    /* event 4624 need to be logged */
    winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and
    source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and 
    not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName : ("svc*", "PIM_*", "_*_", "*-*-*", "*$")] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
   /* event 4724 need to be logged */
  [iam where event.action == "reset-password" and
   (
    /*
       This rule is very noisy if not scoped to privileged accounts, duplicate the
       rule and add your own naming convention and accounts of interest here.
     */
    winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: ("*Admin*", "*super*", "*SVC*", "*DC0*", "*service*", "*DMZ*", "*ADM*") or
    winlog.event_data.TargetSid : ("S-1-5-21-*-500", "S-1-12-1-*-500")
    )
  ] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1098"
name = "Account Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1531"
name = "Account Access Removal"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"