[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/11/04"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/10/23"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies unusual processes connecting to domains using known free SSL certificates. Adversaries may employ a known
encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Connection to Commonly Abused Free SSL Certificate Providers"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "e3cf38fa-d5b8-46cc-87f9-4a7513e4281d"
setup = """

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
"""
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Command and Control", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
network where host.os.type == "windows" and network.protocol == "dns" and
  /* Add new free SSL certificate provider domains here */
  dns.question.name : ("*letsencrypt.org", "*.sslforfree.com", "*.zerossl.com", "*.freessl.org") and

  /* Native Windows process paths that are unlikely to have network connections to domains secured using free SSL certificates */
  process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*.exe",
                        "C:\\Windows\\System\\*.exe",
	                  "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*.exe",
		          "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*.exe",
		          "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
		          "C:\\Windows\\notepad.exe") and

  /* Insert noisy false positives here */
  not process.name : ("svchost.exe", "MicrosoftEdge*.exe", "msedge.exe")
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1573"
name = "Encrypted Channel"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"