[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/02/18"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2022/03/31"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Windows services typically run as SYSTEM and can be used as a privilege escalation opportunity. Malware or penetration
testers may run a shell as a service to gain SYSTEM permissions.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "System Shells via Services"
note = """## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "0022d47d-39c7-4f69-a232-4fe9dc7a3acd"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
  process.parent.name : "services.exe" and
  process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and
  
  /* Third party FP's */
  not process.args : "NVDisplay.ContainerLocalSystem"
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1543.003"
name = "Windows Service"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"