[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/30"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/08/30"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule monitors for the usage of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility to access a disk device without root permissions. 
Linux users that are part of the "disk" group have sufficient privileges to access all data inside of the machine through
DebugFS. Attackers may leverage DebugFS in conjunction with "disk" permissions to read sensitive files owned by root, 
such as the shadow file, root ssh private keys or other sensitive files that may allow them to further escalate 
privileges.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Suspicious DebugFS Root Device Access"
references = ["https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/interesting-groups-linux-pe#disk-group"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "2605aa59-29ac-4662-afad-8d86257c7c91"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and event.type == "start" and 
process.name == "debugfs" and process.args : "/dev/sd*" and not process.args == "-R" and 
not user.Ext.real.id == "0" and not group.Ext.real.id == "0"
'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1078.003"
name = "Local Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"