* [Rule Tuning][New Rule] AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account/ to Allow Public Access
AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account
Low telemetry volume overall, however false positives were seen for cloudfront identity and service accounts being given access to a bucket
- Reduced the scope of this rule to only analyze policy that include account ids or account ARNs (which include an account ID). This eliminates the false positives triggered by sharing buckets with a service account (i.e. cloudtrail.amazonaws.com)
- Excluded cloudfront identity, which should be treated the same way service accounts are being treated and be excluded as they do not include account IDs in their ARN
- This rule wasn't explicitly capturing the use of `Principal: *` which is a public sharing method, often accompanied by a Condition statement (i.e. aws.SourceAccount = OR aws.PrincipalAccount= OR ip.address = ....). The new query will capture Condition statements that include an account id. However there is still a gap for Policies that have explicit `Principal:*` with or without a condition, so another rule was created that will account for these scenarios.
- added highlighted fields
- updated investigation guide and description
- updated Mitre tactics and tags
- `event.type` used in place of `event.category` field
### AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Allow Public Access
Rule added to cover gap in public bucket policy added which includes an `Effect=Allow` and `Principal: *`. While an additional condition might be added to this policy which would exclude public access, cases where the condition is not included mean the bucket is publicly accessible. Both cases need to be verified, because even the condition could be giving access to an attacker owned account. There is also the chance that an `Effect=Deny` for `Principal:*` will trigger a false positive for this rule if the same policy also includes an `Effect=Allow` statement. We call this out in the description, false positive and investigation guide sections of the rule.
* [Rule Tunings] AWS Group Creation, User Added to Group, Group Deletion
All 3 rules are showing extremely low telemetry volume as expected. No major changes needed to these queries.
- updated the descriptions, investigation guides and false positive sections
- reduced execution window
- added highlighted fields
* Revert "[Rule Tunings] AWS Group Creation, User Added to Group, Group Deletion"
This reverts commit c66a4f11e1c690a856b1c2f4cbb03077739629d7.
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# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5189
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## Summary - What I changed
Tunes `Suspicious Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation Scope Detected (9563dace-5822-11f0-b1d3-f661ea17fbcd)` rule to reduce FPs. Please see related issue for more information.
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## How To Test
Query can be used in TRADE stack. TeamFiltration testing and matches occurred in July 2025.
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## Checklist
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
- [ ] Secret and sensitive material has been managed correctly
- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
- [ ] Documentation and comments were added for features that require explanation
## Contributor checklist
- Have you signed the [contributor license agreement](https://www.elastic.co/contributor-agreement)?
- Have you followed the [contributor guidelines](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)?
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5185
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## Summary - What I changed
Adds a specific detection rule for admin confirmed compromise by Entra ID protection. Relates to BBR rule `Microsoft Entra ID Protection - Risk Detections`. Please see related issue for more details.
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## How To Test
Query can be used in TRADE serverless stack.
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## Checklist
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
- [ ] Secret and sensitive material has been managed correctly
- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
- [ ] Documentation and comments were added for features that require explanation
## Contributor checklist
- Have you signed the [contributor license agreement](https://www.elastic.co/contributor-agreement)?
- Have you followed the [contributor guidelines](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)?
* [Rule Tuning] AWS User Created Access Key For Another User
Telemetry looks good for this rule, no way to change this from ESQL as we need to be able to compare fields.
- added event.dataset to query
- added source.ip, cloud.account.id, event.dataset, aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id, and source.geo.* fields to `keep`
- added to highlighted fields
- updated IG
* toml-lint
* [Rule Tuning][New BBR Rule] AWS Sign-In Token Creation and Console Login
### Tuning - "AWS Signin Single Factor Console Login with Federated User"
Rule scope change and name change to match
- This original rule description suggests that it was designed to capture console login sessions by a Federated User without the use of MFA. However, AWS does not capture MFA usage for Federated Users (only for Root and IAM users). Federated identities will often use 3rd party IDP apps like Okta to enforce MFA, that data is not captured in Cloudtrail. So, the fields `MFAUsed` of `mfaAuthenticated` will always show as False/No in Cloudtrail.
- I changed the scope of this rule to simply capture Console Login by a Federated User. For security reasons this behavior should be correlated with 3rd party IDP data to ensure MFA was established by the identity requesting the Federated Console login. This is very low noise behavior both in telemetry and prod data.
- added highlighted fields
- edited investigation guide to align with scope change
### New BBR
- `GetSigninToken` exchanges existing temporary AWS credentials (e.g., from STS GetFederationToken or AssumeRole) for a short-lived sign-in token that is embedded in a one-click URL to the AWS Management Console.
- ConsoleLogin API often follows a `GetSignInToken` request in normal operations. However, suspicious circumstances like both requests coming from different IPs or geo locations might indicate some form of compromise and should be investigated.
- This BBR rule is created to capture all successful `GetSigninToken` requests for any identity type. It can be used for further correlation with other rules or as an investigative/hunting rule during alert triage.
* adding FederatedUser to query
adding FederatedUser to query
* changed ig title to match rule name
changed ig title to match rule name
* toml-lint
* [Rule Tunings] AWS IAM Administrator Access Policy Attached to Group/Role/User
All 3 rules triggering as expected, low telemetry volume. However, the same rule logic can be applied via EQL so I've changed the rule types for all 3 from ESQL to EQL. To provide better telemetry and alert context for users.
- changed rule type to EQL
- updated all IGs
- added highlighted fields
- added index
* removed double note key
removed double note key
* adding iam event.category
* removed file beat compatibility missing category for AttachRolePolicy
filebeat does not have category mapping for AttachRolePolicy event
* toml-lint
* [New Rule] Azure Storage Blob Retrieval via AzCopy with SAS Token
# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5178
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## Summary - What I changed
Adds detection capabilities for Azure Storage Blob retrieval via AzCopy with SAS tokens. Related to behavior observed by Storm-0501. Please see related issue for more details.
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## How To Test
Query can be used in TRADE stack.
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## Checklist
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
- [ ] Secret and sensitive material has been managed correctly
- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
- [ ] Documentation and comments were added for features that require explanation
## Contributor checklist
- Have you signed the [contributor license agreement](https://www.elastic.co/contributor-agreement)?
- Have you followed the [contributor guidelines](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)?
* updating non-ecs
* Update rules/integrations/azure/exfiltration_azure_storage_blob_download_azcopy_sas_token.toml
* Update rules/integrations/azure/exfiltration_azure_storage_blob_download_azcopy_sas_token.toml
* [Rule Tuning][Deprecation] AWS Root Console Login Rules
Deprecate - AWS Root Login Without MFA
- Starting deprecation process for this rule. While root login without MFA should certainly be investigated, this rule overlaps with the broader AWS Successful Root Console login rule. Between the 2, the broader rule should remain since all succesful Root console login events should be investigated. Part of the investigation can include determining if MFA was or was not enabled.
Tuning - AWS Management Console Root Login
No major rule changes needed, telemetry is low as expected for this rule
- reduced execution window
- updated investigation guide
- adjusted tags
- added highlighted fields
- added Mitre subtechnique
Tuning - AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity
No major rule changes needed, telemetry is low as expected for this rule
- reduced execution window
- updated investigation guide
- adjusted tags
- added highlighted field (the only one available for threshold rule is the threshold field)
* adding AWS Sign-In tag
adding AWS Sign-In tag
* [Rule Tunings] AWS Root Password Recovery and Login Profile Created
AWS IAM Password Recovery Requested > AWS Sign-In Root Password Recovery Requested
- Name change to properly indicate the service Sign-In vs IAM which is used for this API call. Also highlights that this is `Root` activity. In AWS, the PasswordRecoveryRequested event from signin.amazonaws.com applies to the root user’s “Forgot your password?” flow. Other identity types, like IAM and federated users, do not generate this event.
- reduced execution window
- updated Investigation Guide
- updated tag
- added highlighted fields
AWS IAM Login Profile Added for Root
- changed rule type from esql to eql
- added index
- reduced execution window
- updated description and investigation guide to clarify emphasis on Root identity scope
- added highlighted fields
* increased severity score
increased severity score since this is related to root
* Update broken link
---------
Co-authored-by: shashank-elastic <91139415+shashank-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
* [Rule Tuning] AWS S3 Bucket Enumeration or Brute Force
- changed to threshold rule to improve context
- groups alerts by unique combination of `tls.client.server_name`(bucket name), `source.address` (can be either an ip or an internal AWS service address like ), and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type` (this is to prevent capturing double events produced when a user Assumes a role inside another AWS account. This results in the same request being created twice, once as both AssumedRole and AWSAccount identity types)
- uses `event.id` as the cardinality field and counts >= 40
- checks that`tls.client.server_name` exists in the query, this is to prevent capturing denied internal AWS actions that may occur against no particular bucket but against the S3 service itself
- adds highlighted fields
- replaces mitre technique
- replaces more detailed investigation guide including specific details around investigating Threshold rule types via timeline
* kuery language update
* removing extra space
* adding integration
* removing filebeat because of tls.client.server_name
removing filebeat because of tls.client.server_name
* update IG references
updated the references listed in the IG
---------
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
- changed rule from esql to new_terms. While details are limited in telemetry, the noise is evident. We've also gotten complaints about the noise from our own infosec team, prompting this tuning. Changes to a new terms rule will reduce noise by over 90% when tested against prod data.
- This originally only triggered for role chaining within a single AWS account, so excluded common cross-account role assumption. However, I am unable to apply a filter for that with KQL but the benefits to creating new-terms rule outweigh the benefits of keeping that exclusion with esql.
- looks for unique combination of `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.session_context.session_issuer.arn` (originating role) and `aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn`(target role). Because the only identity type we are concerned with here are `AssumedRole` types, we don't have the same new_terms field limitations as with other rules that also must consider `IAMUser` types. So these fields will suffice.
- added highlighted fields
- added index pattern. rule is compatible with filebeat
- updated the investigation guide and description and description
Note: I may consider creating a broader BBR rule, with the same criteria just not new terms, as a way of capturing all instances of role chaining for investigative purposes
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
* [Rule Tuning] Potential AWS S3 Bucket Ransomware Note Uploaded
- changed this from ESQL to EQL. While initially were only able to isolate uploaded file names using the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` field, we now can use the target.entity.id field to isolate the uploaded file arn. I've adjusted the regex pattern to distinguish between the bucket name and the file uploaded, both of which are included in the target.entity.id field.
- I chose eql instead of esql to 1. provide more meaningful alert context to the user and 2. allow for easier exclusions for the user. Right now these alerts aren't generating much meaningful context.
- edits to description
- new investigation guide using specific AWS IR Ransomware Playbooks as additional context
- additional MITRE technique
* added highlighted fields
added highlighted fields
* fixed MITRE reference
* added cloudtrail index mapping
* Update rules/integrations/aws/impact_s3_bucket_object_uploaded_with_ransom_extension.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* using aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn instead of target.entity.id
using aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn instead of target.entity.id
* Apply suggestions from code review
---------
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: shashank-elastic <91139415+shashank-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
* [New Rule] Azure RBAC Built-In Administrator Roles Assigned
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# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5108
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## Summary - What I changed
Adds a new rule for detecting `Azure RBAC Built-In Administrator Roles Assigned` from Azure Activity Logs. Please se issue for more details.
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## How To Test
Query can be used in TRADE serverless stack.
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
- [ ] Secret and sensitive material has been managed correctly
- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
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## Contributor checklist
- Have you signed the [contributor license agreement](https://www.elastic.co/contributor-agreement)?
- Have you followed the [contributor guidelines](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)?
* fixed query logic
* fixed query logc
* fixed query logic
* adding field to non-ecs
* updated UUID
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# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5138
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## Summary - What I changed
Adds a missing detection for Azure storage account updates that enabled Blob Storage public access. **Please see the related issue for more details.**
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
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## Contributor checklist
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# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5183
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## Summary - What I changed
Tunes the `Azure Entra ID Rare App ID for Principal Authentication` rule to ignore specific first-party client IDs that generate FPs regarding this rule.
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## How To Test
Query can be used in TRADE or telemetry stack.
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
- [ ] Secret and sensitive material has been managed correctly
- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
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## Contributor checklist
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* [Rule Tuning] Update Azure / M365 Index Patterns and Lookback Windows
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# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5154
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## Summary - What I changed
Adjusts Azure / M365 rules regarding lookback windows, interval and index scopes. Please see related issue for more details.
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
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- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
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## Contributor checklist
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* fixing timestamps
* Update rules/integrations/azure/initial_access_entra_illicit_consent_grant_via_registered_application.toml
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/integrations/azure/credential_access_azure_key_vault_excessive_retrieval.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* update dates
* Update rules/integrations/o365/initial_access_microsoft_365_illicit_consent_grant_via_registered_application.toml
* Update rules/integrations/o365/initial_access_microsoft_365_illicit_consent_grant_via_registered_application.toml
---------
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* [Rule Tuning] Update Azure / M365 Mappings
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# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5152
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## Summary - What I changed
Updates all mappings for Azure / M365 rules for accuracy and missing mappings.
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
- [ ] Secret and sensitive material has been managed correctly
- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
- [ ] Documentation and comments were added for features that require explanation
## Contributor checklist
- Have you signed the [contributor license agreement](https://www.elastic.co/contributor-agreement)?
- Have you followed the [contributor guidelines](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)?
* reverting changes to unit test
* changed webhook rule back to persistence
* Update rules/integrations/azure/persistence_azure_automation_webhook_created.toml
* updated date
* updating date
---------
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* updating Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
* removed logic changes as it only effects outside of PIM. Adding a different rule for these
* slight change to query
* tuning severity
* Update rules/integrations/azure/persistence_azure_global_administrator_role_assigned.toml
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/integrations/azure/persistence_azure_global_administrator_role_assigned.toml
* Update rules/integrations/azure/persistence_azure_global_administrator_role_assigned.toml
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Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
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# Pull Request
*Issue link(s)*:
* https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/5140
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## Summary - What I changed
Adds missing detection coverage for retrieving Azure Storage Account keys by a user with highly-privileged roles. Please see the related issue for more details.
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## How To Test
Query can be used in TRADE stack for telemetry visbility.
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## Checklist
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- [ ] Added a label for the type of pr: `bug`, `enhancement`, `schema`, `maintenance`, `Rule: New`, `Rule: Deprecation`, `Rule: Tuning`, `Hunt: New`, or `Hunt: Tuning` so guidelines can be generated
- [ ] Added the `meta:rapid-merge` label if planning to merge within 24 hours
- [ ] Secret and sensitive material has been managed correctly
- [ ] Automated testing was updated or added to match the most common scenarios
- [ ] Documentation and comments were added for features that require explanation
## Contributor checklist
- Have you signed the [contributor license agreement](https://www.elastic.co/contributor-agreement)?
- Have you followed the [contributor guidelines](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)?
* updating Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
* removed logic changes as it only effects outside of PIM. Adding a different rule for these
* slight change to query
* tuning rule Microsoft Entra ID Elevated Access to User Access Administrator
* revert changes
* Added operation name to query logic
* [Tuning] AWS Access Token Used from Multiple Addresses
Tuning was triggered by a community member
- fixes wildcard and `Pulumi` typos to exclude common IaC tools
- adds exclusion for ``source.as.organization.name` == "AMAZON-02" and aws.cloudtrail.event_category == "Data"` to exclude the noisy multi-IP traffic coming from Amazon-02 networks performing high-throughput data-plane operations. I didn't exclude this network completely because this network can also indicate user-triggered events that are worth keeping in the alert.
- added additional high noise service providers that may be more indicative of console browsing
- added a field for pairing source.ip & network
- added highlighted fields
* Update rules/integrations/aws/initial_access_iam_session_token_used_from_multiple_addresses.toml
* Update rules/integrations/aws/initial_access_iam_session_token_used_from_multiple_addresses.toml
AWS SNS is a pub/sub style service where users can subscribe to a topic and receive messages published to that topic. Below is a screenshot of the different protocols a user could subscribe with and the various endpoints that could be associated with those protocols.
AWS SNS Email Subscription by Rare User --> AWS SNS Rare Protocol Subscription by User (not a new rule)
- changed the scope of the rule to capture the first time a user/role subscribes to a topic via a particular protocol (ie. email, http, lambda, mobile). Subscribing to an SNS topic via email is a rather normal behavior and it would be normal for each user to subscribe this way "for the first time" making this rule not as valuable as it was intended to be.
- reduced execution window
- added real-world threat references
- added additional MITRE technique and Impact tag
- small edits to IG and Description
- edited highlighted fields
AWS SNS Topic Message Publish by Rare User
- added AWS to name for consistency
-changed new terms fields to use a combination of cloud.account.id and user.name against the topic itself `aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn`. So that instead of simply evaluating the first time a user/role publishes a message to ANY topic, this rule now looks for the first time a user/role publishes a message to a particular topic. We want to make this distinction to capture the case where an identity responsible for publishing to a particular topic A suddenly starts publishing to another topic B, which indicates behavior that should be verified.
- reduced new terms window
- added setup notes as Data events are necessary for capturing the `Publish` API call
- reduced execution window
- added real-world threat references
- added additional MITRE technique and Impact tag
- small edits to IG and Description
- edited highlighted fields
AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User
- removed the `AssumedRole` and `*-i*` parameters from the query as this narrowed the query to only alert on behavior from EC2 instance roles. We ideally want to evaluate this behavior for all users and roles.
- reduced execution window
- added real-world threat references
- added additional MITRE technique and Impact tag
- small edits to IG and Description
- edited highlighted fields
* [Rule Tuning] AWS S3 Unauthenticated Bucket Access by Rare Source
No query changes as this rule is alerting as expected, however I did change the new terms field to be a combination of an IP address and a particular bucket name. Rather than just alerting for the IP address itself. Perhaps an IP is seen retrieving a doc from a public bucket in the environment (expected behavior) but then it also accesses a file in a bucket meant to be private (unexpected behavior). With new terms only on the IP address we would miss the private bucket access.
- added `tls.client.server_name` to new terms field (bucket name)
- reduced execution window
- removed duplicate IG
- added setup note for turning on data events
- small edits to description and highlighted fields
* Update collection_s3_unauthenticated_bucket_access_by_rare_source.toml
* Update collection_s3_unauthenticated_bucket_access_by_rare_source.toml
* Update collection_s3_unauthenticated_bucket_access_by_rare_source.toml
* Update collection_s3_unauthenticated_bucket_access_by_rare_source.toml
* [Rule Tunings] AWS DynamoDB new terms Rules
### AWS DynamoDB Scan by Unusual User
- changed new terms field to use cloud.account.id and user.name combination to account for roles and users
- reduced execution window
- reduced history window
- small edits to description, IG and highlighted fields
### AWS DynamoDB Table Exported to S3
- removed inaccurate setup notes
- reduced history window
- small edits to description and highlighted fields
* Apply suggestions from code review
This rule is performing as expected and low noise in telemetry so no changes to query
- added investigation fields
- small edits to description and IG
- added a reference from Unit42 showing real world threat case
- reduced execution window
* [Rule Tuning] SSM Session Started to EC2 Instance
Role/role session noise seen in telemetry due to new fields term using `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn`, which is unique for each role session and does not isolate the role itself.
- new fields term change to `cloud.account.id` and `user.name` combination to account for both IAMUsers and Roles across multiple accounts.
- added AWS to the rule name
- reduced execution window
- small edits to description and IG
- added reference from IG to Reference section
* adding highlighted fields
* added EC2 tag
* Update lateral_movement_aws_ssm_start_session_to_ec2_instance.toml
* Apply suggestions from code review
* [Rule Tunings] AWS Route Table Created / AWS EC2 Route Table Modified or Deleted
AWS Route Table Created
- turned this into a new_terms rule to reduce noise and be more indicative of potential malicious behavior. Used `cloud.account.id`, `user.name` combination to account for both roles and users doing this behavior for the first time.
- changed execution interval
- changed the name to add EC2
- slight adjustments to IG and description
- fixed tagging error
- added investigation fields
AWS EC2 Route Table Modified or Deleted
- replaced new terms field to `cloud.account.id`, `user.name` combination to account for both roles and users doing this behavior for the first time.
- removed the exclusions from this rule. These exclusions, while meant to reduce noise caused by automation tools, actually just provide an easy bypass. A user can simply use CloudFormation to perform the exact same behaviors and avoid detection. I've shown this in the screenshot below, I ran a nearly identical script, one with and one without using CloudFormation. While `source.address` is `cloudformation.amazonaws.com` the behavior was still performed by an IAMUser and should still be evaluated. The fact that this is a new terms rule will reduce the risk of noise due to automation using these tools.
- changed execution interval
- slight adjustments to IG and description
- added investigation fields
* Update persistence_route_table_created.toml
* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_ec2_route_table_modified_or_deleted.toml
- query change : I chose to replace `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` with `user.id` and a more accurate wildcard pattern. This will reduce the chances of this rule triggering for role sessions outside of those started by EC2 instances. The wildcard pattern looks for a role session name that starts with `i-` this is because when an EC2 instance operates using it's attached Role (instance profile), the session name attached to that role name is the instance id (`i-......`). The `user.id` field appends this session name to the role name via a standard pattern `:[session_name]`, making it a more reliable field to use in this case.
- small edits to description and IG
- reduced execution window
- reduced history window
- edited highlighted fields
Note: the new_terms field here remains `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` because we are only interested in assumed roles, and even more particular, only those used by an EC2 instance. This means we want to evaluate each individual instance's behavior rather than the broader behavior of the role itself. The arn field will capture each instance id (session name) alongside the role itself.
* adding new rule 'Threat Intelligence Signal - Microsoft Defender for Office 365'
* added mitre mapping
* Update rules/integrations/o365/initial_access_defender_for_m365_threat_intelligence_signal.toml
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
* added note for max signals
* linted
* fixed unit test failure
---------
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
* tuning rule 'Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled for User'
* adjusted query logic
* fixed query logic for optimization that passes unit tests; changed severity and risk back to medium
Rule is executing as expected, however it is alerting on failed requests. Low alert telemetry.
This tuning:
- removed markdown and edited description to be more specific
- reduced execution window for 1 min lookback
- name change to add `AWS` consistent with all other rules
- added references that reflect in the wild threats and persistence usage
- increased risk_score and severity to medium accounting for usage as persistence mechanism in the wild
- added Persistence tag and Mitre tactic, technique, subtechnique
- added `event.outcome: success` criteria to query
- edited investigation guide to be more accurate reflection of steps required for investigating alert, including appropriate response action
- added highlighted fields
** Note: only IAMUser and Root user identities can call this actions so we can use `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` as the new terms field without worrying about Role vs Role + Session issue seen with other new_terms rules
* [Tuning] First Time AWS Cloudformation Stack Creation by User
- corrected a creation_date error
- Removed `CreateStackSet` API call as this only creates a blueprint for creating stack instances across multiple AWS accounts and regions but does not actually create the resources
- Added `CreateStackInstances` API call which is used to create resources defined in the StackSet
- removed user from rule name as this also triggers for roles
- edited description and investigation guide
- added Mitre technique
* adding highlighted fields
This rule is evaluating the "new terms" against every individual role session, rather than against the Role itself. This is causing a massive volume of alerts
- updated rule description and investigation guide
- reduced execution window and interval
- replaced new terms from `user.id` to combination of `cloud.account.id` and `user.name` to account for evaluation against Roles and in the event that separate AWS accounts under the same Org reuse IAM user names. This will only evaluate the Role instead of each individual role session, which should greatly improve performance.
* [Rule Tuning] AWS STS GetCallerIdentity API Called for the First Time
Rule is executing as expected with no troubling alerts in telemetry. For tuning I've:
- reduced the execution window
- removed MD from description and FP as it's not supported in Kibana UI
- edited some of the language of IG to speak about the exclusion of AssumedRoles
- edited the highlighted fields for consistency across AWS rules
* updated broken link
updated broken reference link
Isai