Commit Graph

417 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jonhnathan 09565d97b7 [New Rule] PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities (#2246)
* [New Rule] PowerShell Script with Token Impersonation Capabilities

* Update privilege_escalation_posh_token_impersonation.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_posh_token_impersonation.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_posh_token_impersonation.toml

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-09-19 15:43:38 -03:00
Jonhnathan a955e34b43 [New Rule] PowerShell Share Enumeration Script (#2243)
* [New Rule] PowerShell Share Enumeration Script

* Move the rule to the correct folder

* Update discovery_posh_invoke_sharefinder.toml

* Update discovery_posh_invoke_sharefinder.toml

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-09-19 15:38:23 -03:00
Jonhnathan d52c0d2257 [Rule Tuning] Remove "process_started" from Windows Rules (#2238)
* [Rule Tuning] Remove "process_started" from Windows Rules

* Additional, pending ones

* Update defense_evasion_code_injection_conhost.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-09-19 13:06:30 -05:00
Samirbous acdfe5ddab [New Rule] Process Creation via Secondary Logon (#2282)
* [New Rule] Process Creation via Secondary Logon

https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/2164

Create process using alternate creds (i.g. runas) :

* Update privilege_escalation_create_process_as_different_user.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_create_process_as_different_user.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-09-19 13:04:08 -05:00
Samirbous 99dcfe2055 [New Rule] Multiple Vault Web credentials were read (#2281)
* [New Rule] Multiple Vault Web credentials were read

https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/2164

* Update credential_access_saved_creds_vault_winlog.toml

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_saved_creds_vault_winlog.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-09-19 19:07:05 +02:00
Samirbous 4609a5e8fe [New Rule] Scheduled Task Creation using winlog (#2277)
* [New Rule] Scheduled Task Creation using winlog

https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/2164 (T1053.005 - Scheduled Task)

- A scheduled task was created
- A scheduled task was updated
- Temp scheduled task (creation followed by deletion, rare and can be sign of proxy execution via schedule service)

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* toml-lint

* remote task

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* waaaaaaaaaaaaaa

* Update persistence_scheduled_task_updated.toml

* Update persistence_scheduled_task_creation_winlog.toml

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* Update lateral_movement_remote_task_creation_winlog.toml

* event.ingested

* Update lateral_movement_remote_task_creation_winlog.toml

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* Update defense_evasion_persistence_temp_scheduled_task.toml

* Update rules/windows/lateral_movement_remote_task_creation_winlog.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-09-19 18:50:45 +02:00
Samirbous fc8ec668b1 [New Rule] Brute Force Detection - Windows (#2275)
* [New Rule] Brute Force Detection - Windows

https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/2164 (T1110 - Brute Force)

- multiple logon failure from same source address in 10s maxspan
- 5 logon failure followed by success from same source address in 5s maxspan

* non ecs

* Update credential_access_bruteforce_multiple_logon_failure_followed_by_success.toml

* fix error

* added bruteforce admin account and linted tomls

* Update credential_access_bruteforce_admin_account.toml

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_bruteforce_admin_account.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* related_rules

* 4625_errorcode_notes

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-09-19 18:43:28 +02:00
Jonhnathan ca2b3c2b7f [New Rule] Full User-Mode Dumps Enabled System-Wide (#2276)
* [New Rule] Full User-Mode Dumps Enabled System-Wide

* Apply suggestions from review

* Update credential_access_generic_localdumps.toml
2022-09-15 16:57:00 -03:00
TotalKnob 3ba777c1b1 [Rule Tuning] Disable Windows Firewall Rules via Netsh (#2231)
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-08-26 13:10:08 -04:00
TotalKnob 97e42d01d8 [Rule Tuning] SUNBURST Command and Control Activity (#2232)
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-08-26 13:11:22 -03:00
Justin Ibarra 46d5e37b76 min_stack all rules to 8.3 (#2259)
* min_stack all rules to 8.3

* bump date

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
2022-08-24 10:38:49 -06:00
TotalKnob 023fbc7bbd [Rule Tuning] Clearing Windows Event Logs (#2233)
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-08-23 21:41:30 -03:00
Jonhnathan 6e2d20362a [Rule Tuning] Standardizing Risk Score according to Severity (#2242) 2022-08-21 22:29:39 -03:00
Samirbous d3420e3386 [Deprecate Rule] Suspicious Process from Conhost (#2222)
only FPs with no way to tune other than opening the rule for easy evasion by excluding by process.executable/args).

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-08-16 16:32:24 +02:00
Samirbous 8e0ae64a04 [Rule Tuning] Whoami Process Activity (#2224)
* added Whoami Process Activity

* Update discovery_whoami_command_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-08-16 16:26:10 +02:00
Samirbous 0f7b29918c [Rule Tuning] Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Task (#2235)
Excluding`?:\\ProgramData` and few other noisy FP pattern by process.args + name to reduce users alert fatigue.
2022-08-15 21:50:23 +02:00
Samirbous b89d6185b2 [Rule Tuning] Reduce FPs (#2223)
9 rules tuned to exclude common noisy FP patterns.

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-08-15 09:15:48 -05:00
Jonhnathan fc7a384d19 [Security Content] 8.4 - Add Investigation Guides - Windows - 2 (#2144)
* [Security Content] 8.4 - Add Investigation Guides - Windows - 2

* update date

* Apply suggestions from review

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-08-08 21:34:05 -03:00
TotalKnob b043695833 Remove ambiguity from impact_modification_of_boot_config.toml (#2199)
Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-08-05 10:38:41 -03:00
Samirbous 50bb821708 [Rules Tuning] Add support for Sysmon ImageLoad Events (#2215)
* [Rules Tuning] Add support for Sysmon ImageLoad Events

added correct event.category and event.action to rules using library events to support sysmon eventid 7.

`event.category == "library"` --> `(event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")`

`dll.name` --> `file.name`

* added Suspicious RDP ActiveX Client Loaded

* Delete workspace.xml
2022-08-02 18:40:26 +02:00
Samirbous b15f0de9a4 [Rules Tuning] Diverse Windows Rules - FPs reduction (#2213)
* [Rules Tuning] 7 diverse Windows rules

Excluding FP patterns while avoiding breaking compat with winlogbeat and 4688 events lack of codesign metadata.

* Update initial_access_suspicious_ms_exchange_process.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_persistence_phantom_dll.toml

* Update execution_psexec_lateral_movement_command.toml

* Update persistence_remote_password_reset.toml

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* Update persistence_remote_password_reset.toml

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* Update discovery_privileged_localgroup_membership.toml
2022-08-02 18:37:07 +02:00
Samirbous a046dc0d29 [Deprecate rule] Whitespace Padding in Process Command Line (#2218)
very noisy and will require frequent tuning with very low TP rate.
2022-08-02 18:30:57 +02:00
Samirbous e5ee8e024f [Deprecate Rule] File and Directory Discovery (#2217)
* [Deprecate Rule] File and Directory Discovery

very noisy and most if not all are FPs, few rooms for tuning without rendering the rule easy to bypass.

* Delete workspace.xml
2022-08-02 17:57:28 +02:00
Samirbous 04dcf09c03 [Rule Tuning] Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace (#2207)
Excluding some FPs by process.parent.executable and process.parent.args.
2022-08-01 19:00:13 +02:00
Samirbous 1f21c5c57f [Rule Tuning] Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service (#2208)
Excluding some noisy unique processes.
2022-08-01 18:40:45 +02:00
Samirbous 8d34416049 [Deprecated Rule] Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos R… (#2209)
* [Deprecated Rule] Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP

FPs in certain cases with no room for tuning.

* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-08-01 18:28:26 +02:00
Samirbous a22fef8723 [Rule Tuning] Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call (#2204)
Excluding some FPs by calltrace.
2022-08-01 18:16:08 +02:00
Samirbous 6f69695820 [Rule Tuning] Remotely Started Services via RPC (#2211)
* [Rule Tuning] Remotely Started Services via RPC

excluding noisy FPs by process.executable to be compatible with winlog and endpoint

* Update lateral_movement_remote_services.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-08-01 18:11:11 +02:00
Samirbous 91896db453 [Rule Tuning] Process Termination followed by Deletion (#2206)
Excluded some FPs by process.executable and file.path.
2022-08-01 18:01:31 +02:00
Samirbous 049fbf7979 [Rule Tuning] Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry (#2203)
* [Rule Tuning] Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry

Excluding some noisy FPs by file.path (user and machine hives std paths) and event.action (scoped to logged-in)

* Update credential_access_remote_sam_secretsdump.toml
2022-08-01 17:49:39 +02:00
Samirbous 527507835f [Rule Tuning] Kerberos Traffic from Unusual Process (#2202)
Excluding couple of FPs by process.executables to reduce FPs rate.
2022-07-29 22:27:59 +02:00
Isai 386a8202c0 [Rule Tuning] Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack (#2195)
* [Rule Tuning] Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack

I changed the query to exclude FPs for safe executables found in telemetry: MoUsoCoreWorker.exe and OfficeC2RClient.exe. Changed the query type to KQL to account for the wildcard needed to capture 2 of the executable paths found in telemetry. I'm open to changing back to eql with suggestions.

* Update persistence_via_update_orchestrator_service_hijack.toml

revert back to eql

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-29 16:11:16 -04:00
Samirbous 6d61a68c29 [Rule Tuning] Modification of WDigest Security Provider (#2201)
excluding svchost.exe running as system (main src of FPs for this use case).
2022-07-29 19:45:33 +02:00
Terrance DeJesus e8c39d19a7 [Rule Tuning] Missing MITRE ATT&CK Mappings (#2073)
* initial commit with eggshell mitre mapping added

* adding updated rules

* [Rule Tuning] MITRE for GCP rules

I've added Mitre references for the 4 GCP rules missing. Changed 3 of the rules from "Impact" to "Defense Evasion" based on the technique used and it's matched tactic.

* [Rule Tuning] Endgame Rule name updates for Mitre

Updated Endgame rule names for those with Mitre tactics to match the tactics.

* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_redshift_instance_creation.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* adding 10 updated rules for google_workspace, ml and o365

* adding 22 rule updates for mitre att&ck mappings

* adding 24 rule updates related mainly to ML rules

* adding 3 rules related to detection via ML

* adding adjustments

* adding adjustments with solutions to recent pytest errors

* removed tabs from tags

* adjusted mappings and added techniques

* adjusted endgame rule mappings per review

* adjusted names to match different tactics

* added execution and defense evasion tag

* adjustments to address errors from merging with main

* added newlines to rules missing them at the end of the file

Co-authored-by: imays11 <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-07-22 14:30:34 -04:00
Samirbous d312f49117 [New Rule] Suspicious HTML File Creation (#2068)
* [New Rule] Suspicious HTML File Creation

* Update initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* Update initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml

* Update rules/windows/initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-07-22 16:21:53 +02:00
Jonhnathan d854b943e5 [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Cloud Rules - AWS (#2104)
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Cloud Rules - AWS

* Apply suggestion from review

* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_ec2_snapshot_change_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/impact_cloudwatch_log_stream_deletion.toml

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>

* Apply suggestions from review

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

* .

* Applies suggestions from the https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/2124 PR

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-20 12:28:58 -03:00
Samirbous 59736e3973 [New Rule] Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon (#2063)
* [New Rule]

Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access rights value, this may indicate an attempt to leak an Lsass handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access.

https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html

Data:

```
{
  "_index": ".ds-logs-windows.sysmon_operational-default-2022.06.16-000005",
  "_id": "QxU4rIEBTJjT82fLq8Cf",
  "_score": 1,
  "_source": {
    "agent": {
      "name": "02694w-win10",
      "id": "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e",
      "type": "filebeat",
      "ephemeral_id": "137d194a-e542-4cd6-a1e3-f4ca9f5ad6b8",
      "version": "8.0.0"
    },
    "process": {
      "name": "svchost.exe",
      "pid": 456,
      "thread": {
        "id": 15264
      },
      "entity_id": "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}",
      "executable": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe"
    },
    "winlog": {
      "computer_name": "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
      "process": {
        "pid": 2680,
        "thread": {
          "id": 3988
        }
      },
      "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
      "event_data": {
        "GrantedAccess": "0x14c0",
        "TargetProcessId": "680",
        "SourceUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
        "TargetImage": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe",
        "CallTrace": "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51",
        "TargetProcessGUID": "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}",
        "TargetUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
      },
      "opcode": "Info",
      "version": 3,
      "record_id": "1825496",
      "task": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
      "event_id": "10",
      "provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
      "api": "wineventlog",
      "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
      "user": {
        "identifier": "S-1-5-18",
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "name": "SYSTEM",
        "type": "User"
      }
    },
    "log": {
      "level": "information"
    },
    "elastic_agent": {
      "id": "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e",
      "version": "8.0.0",
      "snapshot": false
    },
    "message": "Process accessed:\nRuleName: -\nUtcTime: 2022-06-28 21:29:49.829\nSourceProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}\nSourceProcessId: 456\nSourceThreadId: 15264\nSourceImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe\nTargetProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}\nTargetProcessId: 680\nTargetImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe\nGrantedAccess: 0x14C0\nCallTrace: C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\nSourceUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\nTargetUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
    "input": {
      "type": "winlog"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-06-28T21:29:49.829Z",
    "ecs": {
      "version": "1.12.0"
    },
    "data_stream": {
      "namespace": "default",
      "type": "logs",
      "dataset": "windows.sysmon_operational"
    },
    "host": {
      "hostname": "02694w-win10",
      "os": {
        "build": "18363.815",
        "kernel": "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
        "name": "Windows 10 Enterprise",
        "type": "windows",
        "family": "windows",
        "version": "10.0",
        "platform": "windows"
      },
      "ip": [
        "fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
        "172.16.66.25"
      ],
      "name": "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
      "id": "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160",
      "mac": [
        "00:50:56:03:c6:93"
      ],
      "architecture": "x86_64"
    },
    "event": {
      "agent_id_status": "verified",
      "ingested": "2022-06-28T21:30:04Z",
      "code": "10",
      "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
      "created": "2022-06-28T21:29:51.107Z",
      "kind": "event",
      "action": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
      "category": [
        "process"
      ],
      "type": [
        "access"
      ],
      "dataset": "windows.sysmon_operational"
    },
    "user": {
      "id": "S-1-5-18"
    }
  },
  "fields": {
    "elastic_agent.version": [
      "8.0.0"
    ],
    "event.category": [
      "process"
    ],
    "host.os.name.text": [
      "Windows 10 Enterprise"
    ],
    "winlog.provider_guid": [
      "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}"
    ],
    "winlog.provider_name": [
      "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    ],
    "host.hostname": [
      "02694w-win10"
    ],
    "winlog.computer_name": [
      "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com"
    ],
    "process.pid": [
      456
    ],
    "host.mac": [
      "00:50:56:03:c6:93"
    ],
    "winlog.process.pid": [
      2680
    ],
    "host.os.version": [
      "10.0"
    ],
    "winlog.record_id": [
      "1825496"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetUser": [
      "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
    ],
    "host.os.name": [
      "Windows 10 Enterprise"
    ],
    "log.level": [
      "information"
    ],
    "agent.name": [
      "02694w-win10"
    ],
    "host.name": [
      "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com"
    ],
    "event.agent_id_status": [
      "verified"
    ],
    "event.kind": [
      "event"
    ],
    "winlog.version": [
      3
    ],
    "host.os.type": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "user.id": [
      "S-1-5-18"
    ],
    "input.type": [
      "winlog"
    ],
    "data_stream.type": [
      "logs"
    ],
    "host.architecture": [
      "x86_64"
    ],
    "process.name": [
      "svchost.exe"
    ],
    "event.provider": [
      "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    ],
    "event.code": [
      "10"
    ],
    "agent.id": [
      "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e"
    ],
    "ecs.version": [
      "1.12.0"
    ],
    "event.created": [
      "2022-06-28T21:29:51.107Z"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.CallTrace": [
      "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51"
    ],
    "agent.version": [
      "8.0.0"
    ],
    "host.os.family": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "process.thread.id": [
      15264
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetProcessGUID": [
      "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}"
    ],
    "winlog.process.thread.id": [
      3988
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetImage": [
      "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetProcessId": [
      "680"
    ],
    "process.entity_id": [
      "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}"
    ],
    "host.os.build": [
      "18363.815"
    ],
    "winlog.user.type": [
      "User"
    ],
    "host.ip": [
      "fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
      "172.16.66.25"
    ],
    "agent.type": [
      "filebeat"
    ],
    "event.module": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "host.os.kernel": [
      "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)"
    ],
    "winlog.api": [
      "wineventlog"
    ],
    "elastic_agent.snapshot": [
      false
    ],
    "host.id": [
      "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160"
    ],
    "process.executable": [
      "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe"
    ],
    "winlog.user.identifier": [
      "S-1-5-18"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.SourceUser": [
      "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
    ],
    "winlog.task": [
      "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)"
    ],
    "winlog.user.domain": [
      "NT AUTHORITY"
    ],
    "elastic_agent.id": [
      "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e"
    ],
    "data_stream.namespace": [
      "default"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess": [
      "0x14c0"
    ],
    "message": [
      "Process accessed:\nRuleName: -\nUtcTime: 2022-06-28 21:29:49.829\nSourceProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}\nSourceProcessId: 456\nSourceThreadId: 15264\nSourceImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe\nTargetProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}\nTargetProcessId: 680\nTargetImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe\nGrantedAccess: 0x14C0\nCallTrace: C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\nSourceUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\nTargetUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
    ],
    "winlog.user.name": [
      "SYSTEM"
    ],
    "winlog.event_id": [
      "10"
    ],
    "event.ingested": [
      "2022-06-28T21:30:04.000Z"
    ],
    "event.action": [
      "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)"
    ],
    "@timestamp": [
      "2022-06-28T21:29:49.829Z"
    ],
    "winlog.channel": [
      "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    ],
    "host.os.platform": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "data_stream.dataset": [
      "windows.sysmon_operational"
    ],
    "event.type": [
      "access"
    ],
    "winlog.opcode": [
      "Info"
    ],
    "agent.ephemeral_id": [
      "137d194a-e542-4cd6-a1e3-f4ca9f5ad6b8"
    ],
    "event.dataset": [
      "windows.sysmon_operational"
    ]
  }
}
```

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-20 16:30:19 +02:00
Mika Ayenson a52751494e 2058 add setup field to metadata (#2061)
* Convert config header to setup in note field
* Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm
* only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable

Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-18 15:41:32 -04:00
Jonhnathan 3a8efc8183 [Security Content] 8.4 - Add Investigation Guides (#2069)
* [Security Content] 8.4 - Add Investigation Guides

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_cmdline_dump_tool.toml

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_credential_dumping_msbuild.toml

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-13 11:28:34 -03:00
Terrance DeJesus 329530c8c3 [New Rule] Domain Trust Enumeration via Nltest (#2010)
* adding detection rule

* removed changes from unrelated rule

* adjusted threat technique

* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml

* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-05 10:48:25 -04:00
Jonhnathan 853f8db8d0 Update discovery_privileged_localgroup_membership.toml (#2046) 2022-06-30 14:26:17 -03:00
Jonhnathan c8ff1dc9cb Update discovery_remote_system_discovery_commands_windows.toml (#2033) 2022-06-14 10:50:59 -03:00
Jonhnathan b6631f200e Update persistence_sdprop_exclusion_dsheuristics.toml (#2017) 2022-06-03 14:22:04 -03:00
Jonhnathan f857e009c5 Adds logs-system.* index pattern (#2016) 2022-06-03 13:56:54 -03:00
Samirbous d6e96a83d5 [New Rule] Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution (#2005)
* [New Rule] Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution

https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_proxy_execution_via_msdt.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-06-01 17:02:47 +02:00
Jonhnathan 27f5c2e695 [Security Content] 8.3 Add Investigation Guides - 3 (#1990)
* [Security Content] 8.3 Add Investigation Guides - 3

* bump date

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>
2022-05-31 12:57:02 -03:00
Jonhnathan e5d3c6329c [Security Content] 8.3 - Add Investigation Guides 2 (#1989)
* [Security Content] 8.3 - Add Investigation Guides 2 - Initial Commit

* .

* Add Related rules

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

* .

* .

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>
2022-05-31 12:54:42 -03:00
Samirbous bfea11c99f [Rule Tuning] Suspicious MS Office Child Process (#2003)
added msdt.exe as a response to this in the wild 0day (works without vba and on latest office) ->

https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection
2022-05-31 14:20:51 +02:00
Jonhnathan 1f8813d02f [Promote Rule] Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script (#1993)
* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml

* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml

* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml

* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-05-25 17:02:21 -03:00
Justin Ibarra 72c186b30b [Rule tuning] Whitespace Padding in Process Command Line (#1967)
* [Rule tuning] Whitespace Padding in Process Command Line

* bump updated_date

* update comment

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-05-23 14:33:48 -05:00