Completing the Deprecation process for these rules as they have been shipped at least 2 release cycles with "Deprecated - " prefix.
All have the following metadata changes
maturity = "deprecated"
updated_date = "2026/01/16"
deprecation_date = "2026/01/16"
Completing Deprecation Process for this rule. It has now been included in our ruleset with `Deprecated -` prefix for 2 release cycles and should now be moved to our `_deprecated` folder.
* adjusted Potential Widespread Malware Infection Across Multiple Hosts
* adjusted Microsoft Azure or Mail Sign-in from a Suspicious Source
* adjusted AWS EC2 Multi-Region DescribeInstances API Calls
* adjusted AWS Discovery API Calls via CLI from a Single Resource
* adjusted AWS Service Quotas Multi-Region Requests
* adjusted AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Shared or Made Public
* adjusted AWS S3 Bucket Enumeration or Brute Force
* adjusted AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Access Removed
* adjusted Potential AWS S3 Bucket Ransomware Note Uploaded
* adjusted AWS S3 Object Encryption Using External KMS Key
* adjusted AWS S3 Static Site JavaScript File Uploaded
* adjusted AWS Access Token Used from Multiple Addresses
* adjusted AWS Signin Single Factor Console Login with Federated User
* adjusted AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to Group
* adjusted AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to Role
* adjusted AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to User
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Invocations without Guardrails Detected by a Single User Over a Session
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Guardrails Detected Multiple Violations by a Single User Over a Session
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Guardrails Detected Multiple Policy Violations Within a Single Blocked Request
* adjusted Unusual High Confidence Content Filter Blocks Detected
* adjusted Potential Abuse of Resources by High Token Count and Large Response Sizes
* AWS Bedrock Detected Multiple Attempts to use Denied Models by a Single User
* Unusual High Denied Sensitive Information Policy Blocks Detected
* adjusted Unusual High Denied Topic Blocks Detected
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Detected Multiple Validation Exception Errors by a Single User
* adjusted Unusual High Word Policy Blocks Detected
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Concurrent Sign-Ins with Suspicious Properties
* adjusted Azure Entra MFA TOTP Brute Force Attempts
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Brute Force Activity
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Exccessive Account Lockouts Detected
* adjusted Microsoft 365 Brute Force via Entra ID Sign-Ins
* deprecated Azure Entra Sign-in Brute Force Microsoft 365 Accounts by Repeat Source
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Session Reuse with Suspicious Graph Access
* adjusted Suspicious Microsoft OAuth Flow via Auth Broker to DRS
* adjusted Potential Denial of Azure OpenAI ML Service
* adjusted Azure OpenAI Insecure Output Handling
* adjusted Potential Azure OpenAI Model Theft
* adjusted M365 OneDrive Excessive File Downloads with OAuth Token
* adjusted Multiple Microsoft 365 User Account Lockouts in Short Time Window
* adjusted Potential Microsoft 365 User Account Brute Force
* adjusted Suspicious Microsoft 365 UserLoggedIn via OAuth Code
* adjusted Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session
* adjusted Multiple Okta User Authentication Events with Client Address
* adjusted Multiple Okta User Authentication Events with Same Device Token Hash
* adjusted High Number of Okta Device Token Cookies Generated for Authentication
* adjusted Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations
* adjusted High Number of Egress Network Connections from Unusual Executable
* adjusted Unusual Base64 Encoding/Decoding Activity
* adjusted Potential Port Scanning Activity from Compromised Host
* adjusted Potential Subnet Scanning Activity from Compromised Host
* adjusted Unusual File Transfer Utility Launched
* adjusted Potential Malware-Driven SSH Brute Force Attempt
* adjusted Unusual Process Spawned from Web Server Parent
* adjusted Unusual Command Execution from Web Server Parent
* adjusted Rare Connection to WebDAV Target
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Invalid Escape Sequences
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Backtick-Escaped Variable Expansion
* adjusted Unusual File Creation by Web Server
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Special Character Proportion
* adjusted Potential Malicious PowerShell Based on Alert Correlation
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Character Array Reconstruction
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Reordering
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Concatenation
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Reverse Keywords
* adjusted PowerShell Obfuscation via Negative Index String Reversal
* adjusted Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Method String Access
* adjusted Potential Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Environment Variables
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Numeric Character Proportion
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Concatenated Dynamic Command Invocation
* adjusted Rare Connection to WebDAV Target
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Invalid Escape Sequences
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Backtick-Escaped Variable Expansion
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Character Array Reconstruction
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Special Character Proportion
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Special Character Overuse
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Reordering
* adjusted Suspicious Microsoft 365 UserLoggedIn via OAuth Code
* adjusted fields that were inconsistent
* adjusted additional fields
* adjusted esql to Esql
* adjusted several rules for common field names
* updating rules
* updated dates
* updated dates
* updated ESQL fields
* lowercase all functions and logical operators
* adjusted dates for unit tests
* Update Esql_priv to Esql_temp as these don't hold PII
* PowerShell adjustments
* Make query comments consistent
* update comment
* reverted 2856446a-34e6-435b-9fb5-f8f040bfa7ed
* Update rules/windows/discovery_command_system_account.toml
* removed dot notation
---------
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
Completing Deprecation process for AWS EC2 Snapshot Activity
- It's been 2 rule releases since initial name change
- changed maturity to deprecation
- updated deprecation_date
- moved file to _deprecated folder
* tuned web shell logic, and converted to EQL
* Removed old, created new rule to bypass "type" bug
* Revert "Removed old, created new rule to bypass "type" bug"
This reverts commit e994b62ecb838f73fa56d145e529169ebd2f5133.
* Revert "tuned web shell logic, and converted to EQL"
This reverts commit 28bda94b846cbb4ae1a084e707db2b6df458a7ca.
* Deprecated old rule, added new
* formatting fix
* removed endgame index
* Fixed changes captured as edited, not created
* Update rules/linux/persistence_shell_activity_through_web_server.toml
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix conflict
* added host.os.type==linux for unit testing
* removed wildcards in process.args
* Update rules/linux/persistence_shell_activity_via_web_server.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* fixed conflict by changing file name and changes
* Trying to resolve the GH conflict
* attempt to fix GH conflict #2
* Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml
* Added endgame support
* Added OSQuery to investigation guide
* Update rules/linux/persistence_linux_shell_activity_via_web_server.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/linux/persistence_linux_shell_activity_via_web_server.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* removed investigation guide to add in future PR
---------
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update privilege_escalation_gcp_kubernetes_rolebindings_created_or_patched.toml
Deprecating this rule due to high false positive rate. This behavior is too generic for an effective malicious behavior detection.
* move toml file to _deprecated
move toml file to _deprecated
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
only FPs with no way to tune other than opening the rule for easy evasion by excluding by process.executable/args).
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
* [Deprecate Rule] File and Directory Discovery
very noisy and most if not all are FPs, few rooms for tuning without rendering the rule easy to bypass.
* Delete workspace.xml
* [Deprecated Rule] Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP
FPs in certain cases with no room for tuning.
* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Isai