* [Tuning] Windows BruteForce Rules Tuning
#1 Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Address: converted to ES|QL and raised the threshold to 100 failed auths, alert quality should be better since it aggregates all failed auths info into one alert vs multiple EQL matches. (expected reduction more than 50%)
#2 Privileged Account Brute Force - coverted to ESQL and set the threshold to 50 in a minute. this should drop noise volume by more than 50%.
* ++
* Update execution_shell_evasion_linux_binary.toml
* Update execution_shell_evasion_linux_binary.toml
* Update defense_evasion_indirect_exec_forfiles.toml
* Update lateral_movement_remote_file_copy_hidden_share.toml
* Update lateral_movement_remote_file_copy_hidden_share.toml
* Update persistence_service_windows_service_winlog.toml
* Update credential_access_lsass_openprocess_api.toml
* Update persistence_suspicious_scheduled_task_runtime.toml
* Update impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
* Update defense_evasion_process_termination_followed_by_deletion.toml
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_openprocess_api.toml
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_bruteforce_admin_account.toml
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_openprocess_api.toml
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_bruteforce_multiple_logon_failure_same_srcip.toml
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update credential_access_lsass_openprocess_api.toml
* Update impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
* Update credential_access_dollar_account_relay.toml
* Update credential_access_new_terms_secretsmanager_getsecretvalue.toml
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Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
* [New Rule] Pod or Container Creation with Suspicious Command-Line
* Added container domain tag
* Update execution_suspicious_pod_or_container_creation_command_execution.toml
* Refine EQL query for suspicious pod/container creation
* Update rules/linux/execution_suspicious_pod_or_container_creation_command_execution.toml
* Update execution_suspicious_pod_or_container_creation_command_execution.toml
* Update process name conditions for suspicious execution
* [Rule Tuning] File Transfer or Listener Established via Netcat
* Formatting
* Update execution_file_transfer_or_listener_established_via_netcat.toml
* Update execution_file_transfer_or_listener_established_via_netcat.toml
* Add timestamp override to netcat execution rule
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Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
* [Rule Tuning] Potential Port Scanning Activity from Compromised Host
* Update rules/linux/discovery_port_scanning_activity_from_compromised_host.toml
* Update port scanning detection query
Refine query to include source IP and limit destination port range.
* Update discovery_port_scanning_activity_from_compromised_host.toml
* Update query in discovery port scanning rule
* Update discovery_port_scanning_activity_from_compromised_host.toml
* adjusted Potential Widespread Malware Infection Across Multiple Hosts
* adjusted Microsoft Azure or Mail Sign-in from a Suspicious Source
* adjusted AWS EC2 Multi-Region DescribeInstances API Calls
* adjusted AWS Discovery API Calls via CLI from a Single Resource
* adjusted AWS Service Quotas Multi-Region Requests
* adjusted AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Shared or Made Public
* adjusted AWS S3 Bucket Enumeration or Brute Force
* adjusted AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Access Removed
* adjusted Potential AWS S3 Bucket Ransomware Note Uploaded
* adjusted AWS S3 Object Encryption Using External KMS Key
* adjusted AWS S3 Static Site JavaScript File Uploaded
* adjusted AWS Access Token Used from Multiple Addresses
* adjusted AWS Signin Single Factor Console Login with Federated User
* adjusted AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to Group
* adjusted AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to Role
* adjusted AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached to User
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Invocations without Guardrails Detected by a Single User Over a Session
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Guardrails Detected Multiple Violations by a Single User Over a Session
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Guardrails Detected Multiple Policy Violations Within a Single Blocked Request
* adjusted Unusual High Confidence Content Filter Blocks Detected
* adjusted Potential Abuse of Resources by High Token Count and Large Response Sizes
* AWS Bedrock Detected Multiple Attempts to use Denied Models by a Single User
* Unusual High Denied Sensitive Information Policy Blocks Detected
* adjusted Unusual High Denied Topic Blocks Detected
* adjusted AWS Bedrock Detected Multiple Validation Exception Errors by a Single User
* adjusted Unusual High Word Policy Blocks Detected
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Concurrent Sign-Ins with Suspicious Properties
* adjusted Azure Entra MFA TOTP Brute Force Attempts
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Brute Force Activity
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Exccessive Account Lockouts Detected
* adjusted Microsoft 365 Brute Force via Entra ID Sign-Ins
* deprecated Azure Entra Sign-in Brute Force Microsoft 365 Accounts by Repeat Source
* adjusted Microsoft Entra ID Session Reuse with Suspicious Graph Access
* adjusted Suspicious Microsoft OAuth Flow via Auth Broker to DRS
* adjusted Potential Denial of Azure OpenAI ML Service
* adjusted Azure OpenAI Insecure Output Handling
* adjusted Potential Azure OpenAI Model Theft
* adjusted M365 OneDrive Excessive File Downloads with OAuth Token
* adjusted Multiple Microsoft 365 User Account Lockouts in Short Time Window
* adjusted Potential Microsoft 365 User Account Brute Force
* adjusted Suspicious Microsoft 365 UserLoggedIn via OAuth Code
* adjusted Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session
* adjusted Multiple Okta User Authentication Events with Client Address
* adjusted Multiple Okta User Authentication Events with Same Device Token Hash
* adjusted High Number of Okta Device Token Cookies Generated for Authentication
* adjusted Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations
* adjusted High Number of Egress Network Connections from Unusual Executable
* adjusted Unusual Base64 Encoding/Decoding Activity
* adjusted Potential Port Scanning Activity from Compromised Host
* adjusted Potential Subnet Scanning Activity from Compromised Host
* adjusted Unusual File Transfer Utility Launched
* adjusted Potential Malware-Driven SSH Brute Force Attempt
* adjusted Unusual Process Spawned from Web Server Parent
* adjusted Unusual Command Execution from Web Server Parent
* adjusted Rare Connection to WebDAV Target
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Invalid Escape Sequences
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Backtick-Escaped Variable Expansion
* adjusted Unusual File Creation by Web Server
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Special Character Proportion
* adjusted Potential Malicious PowerShell Based on Alert Correlation
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Character Array Reconstruction
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Reordering
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Concatenation
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Reverse Keywords
* adjusted PowerShell Obfuscation via Negative Index String Reversal
* adjusted Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Method String Access
* adjusted Potential Dynamic IEX Reconstruction via Environment Variables
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Numeric Character Proportion
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Concatenated Dynamic Command Invocation
* adjusted Rare Connection to WebDAV Target
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Invalid Escape Sequences
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Backtick-Escaped Variable Expansion
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Character Array Reconstruction
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via High Special Character Proportion
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via Special Character Overuse
* adjusted Potential PowerShell Obfuscation via String Reordering
* adjusted Suspicious Microsoft 365 UserLoggedIn via OAuth Code
* adjusted fields that were inconsistent
* adjusted additional fields
* adjusted esql to Esql
* adjusted several rules for common field names
* updating rules
* updated dates
* updated dates
* updated ESQL fields
* lowercase all functions and logical operators
* adjusted dates for unit tests
* Update Esql_priv to Esql_temp as these don't hold PII
* PowerShell adjustments
* Make query comments consistent
* update comment
* reverted 2856446a-34e6-435b-9fb5-f8f040bfa7ed
* Update rules/windows/discovery_command_system_account.toml
* removed dot notation
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Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
Ruben Groenewoud