diff --git a/rules/integrations/o365/credential_access_microsoft_365_excessive_account_lockouts.toml b/rules/integrations/o365/credential_access_microsoft_365_excessive_account_lockouts.toml
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+++ b/rules/integrations/o365/credential_access_microsoft_365_excessive_account_lockouts.toml
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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2025/05/10"
+integration = ["o365"]
+maturity = "production"
+min_stack_version = "8.17.0"
+min_stack_comments = "Elastic ES|QL values aggregation is more performant in 8.16.5 and above."
+updated_date = "2025/05/10"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Detects a burst of Microsoft 365 user account lockouts within a short 5-minute window. A high number of IdsLocked login
+errors across multiple user accounts may indicate brute-force attempts for the same users resulting in lockouts.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+language = "esql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Multiple Microsoft 365 User Account Lockouts in Short Time Window"
+note = """## Triage and Analysis
+
+### Investigating Multiple Microsoft 365 User Account Lockouts in Short Time Window
+
+Detects a burst of Microsoft 365 user account lockouts within a short 5-minute window. A high number of IdsLocked login errors across multiple user accounts may indicate brute-force attempts for the same users resulting in lockouts.
+
+This rule uses ES|QL aggregations and thus has dynamically generated fields. Correlation of the values in the alert document may need to be performed to the original sign-in and Graph events for further context.
+
+### Investigation Steps
+
+- Review the `user_id_list`: Are specific naming patterns targeted (e.g., admin, helpdesk)?
+- Examine `ip_list` and `source_orgs`: Look for suspicious ISPs or hosting providers.
+- Check `duration_seconds`: A very short window with a high lockout rate often indicates automation.
+- Confirm lockout policy thresholds with IAM or Entra ID admins. Did the policy trigger correctly?
+- Use the `first_seen` and `last_seen` values to pivot into related authentication or audit logs.
+- Correlate with any recent detection of password spraying or credential stuffing activity.
+- Review the `request_type` field to identify which authentication methods were used (e.g., OAuth, SAML, etc.).
+- Check for any successful logins from the same IP or ASN after the lockouts.
+
+### False Positive Analysis
+
+- Automated systems with stale credentials may cause repeated failed logins.
+- Legitimate bulk provisioning or scripted tests could unintentionally cause account lockouts.
+- Red team exercises or penetration tests may resemble the same lockout pattern.
+- Some organizations may have a high volume of lockouts due to user behavior or legacy systems.
+
+### Response Recommendations
+
+- Notify affected users and confirm whether activity was expected or suspicious.
+- Lock or reset credentials for impacted accounts.
+- Block the source IP(s) or ASN temporarily using conditional access or firewall rules.
+- Strengthen lockout and retry delay policies if necessary.
+- Review the originating application(s) involved via `request_types`.
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/operations/incident-response-playbook-password-spray",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-detailed-properties",
+    "https://securityscorecard.com/research/massive-botnet-targets-m365-with-stealthy-password-spraying-attacks/",
+    "https://github.com/0xZDH/Omnispray",
+    "https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "de67f85e-2d43-11f0-b8c9-f661ea17fbcc"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Domain: SaaS",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft 365",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "esql"
+
+query = '''
+FROM logs-o365.audit-*
+
+| MV_EXPAND event.category
+| EVAL
+    time_window = DATE_TRUNC(5 minutes, @timestamp),
+    user_id = TO_LOWER(o365.audit.UserId),
+    ip = source.ip,
+    login_error = o365.audit.LogonError,
+    request_type = TO_LOWER(o365.audit.ExtendedProperties.RequestType),
+    asn_org = source.`as`.organization.name,
+    country = source.geo.country_name,
+    event_time = @timestamp
+
+| WHERE event.dataset == "o365.audit"
+  AND event.category == "authentication"
+  AND event.provider IN ("AzureActiveDirectory", "Exchange")
+  AND event.action IN ("UserLoginFailed", "PasswordLogonInitialAuthUsingPassword")
+  AND request_type RLIKE "(oauth.*||.*login.*)"
+  AND login_error == "IdsLocked"
+  AND user_id != "not available"
+  AND o365.audit.Target.Type IN ("0", "2", "6", "10")
+  AND asn_org != "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK"
+
+| STATS
+    unique_users = COUNT_DISTINCT(user_id),
+    user_id_list = VALUES(user_id),
+    ip_list = VALUES(ip),
+    unique_ips = COUNT_DISTINCT(ip),
+    source_orgs = VALUES(asn_org),
+    countries = VALUES(country),
+    unique_country_count = COUNT_DISTINCT(country),
+    unique_asn_orgs = COUNT_DISTINCT(asn_org),
+    request_types = VALUES(request_type),
+    first_seen = MIN(event_time),
+    last_seen = MAX(event_time),
+    total_lockout_responses = COUNT()
+  BY time_window
+
+| EVAL
+    duration_seconds = DATE_DIFF("seconds", first_seen, last_seen)
+
+| KEEP
+    time_window, unique_users, user_id_list, ip_list,
+    unique_ips, source_orgs, countries, unique_country_count,
+    unique_asn_orgs, request_types, first_seen, last_seen,
+    total_lockout_responses, duration_seconds
+
+| WHERE
+    unique_users >= 10 AND
+    total_lockout_responses >= 10 AND
+    duration_seconds <= 300
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1110"
+name = "Brute Force"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+