diff --git a/rules/aws/defense_evasion_config_service_rule_deletion.toml b/rules/aws/defense_evasion_config_service_rule_deletion.toml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6379237f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rules/aws/defense_evasion_config_service_rule_deletion.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/06/26"
+ecs_version = ["1.5.0"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2020/07/07"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies attempts to delete an AWS Config Service rule. An adversary may tamper with Config rules in order to
+reduce visibiltiy into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Privileged IAM users with security responsibilities may be expected to make changes to the Config rules in order
+    to align with local security policies and requirements. Automation, orchestration, and security tools may also make
+    changes to the Config service, where they are used to automate setup or configuration of AWS accounts. Other kinds
+    of user or service contexts do not commonly make changes to this service.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-60m"
+index = ["filebeat-*"]
+interval = "10m"
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License"
+name = "AWS Config Service Tampering"
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/how-does-config-work.html",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "7024e2a0-315d-4334-bb1a-552d604f27bc"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = ["AWS", "Elastic"]
+type = "query"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail and event.action: DeleteConfigRule and event.provider: config.amazonaws.com
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1089"
+name = "Disabling Security Tools"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0005"
+name = "Defense Evasion"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"