From ba55fb412ba5e38dec19ca03c69e574eec87813a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2025 08:08:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] [New] Potential CVE-2025-33053 Exploitation (#4795) * Create initial_access_url_cve_2025_33053.toml * Delete docs/docset.yml * Revert "Delete docs/docset.yml" This reverts commit 5d0e6a68eb5510b6f3d9325cfcdf156bf11e1992. * Update initial_access_url_cve_2025_33053.toml --- .../initial_access_url_cve_2025_33053.toml | 120 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 120 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rules/windows/initial_access_url_cve_2025_33053.toml diff --git a/rules/windows/initial_access_url_cve_2025_33053.toml b/rules/windows/initial_access_url_cve_2025_33053.toml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..17c356f8d --- /dev/null +++ b/rules/windows/initial_access_url_cve_2025_33053.toml @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +[metadata] +creation_date = "2025/06/11" +integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"] +maturity = "production" +updated_date = "2025/06/11" + +[rule] +author = ["Elastic"] +description = """ +Identifies a suspicious Diagnostics Utility for Internet Explorer child process. This may indicate the successful exploitation of the vulnerability CVE-2025-33053. +""" +from = "now-9m" +index = [ + "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", + "endgame-*", + "logs-m365_defender.event-*", + "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", +] +language = "eql" +license = "Elastic License v2" +name = "Potential CVE-2025-33053 Exploitation" +note = """## Triage and analysis + +### Investigating Potential CVE-2025-33053 Exploitation + +### Possible investigation steps + +- Review the process details to confirm the suspicious child process was indeed started by iediagcmd.exe. +- Check any URL file type creation before the alert and review the source of those files. +- Investigate the process tree and make sure all descendant processes are terminated. +- Examine the network activity associated with the suspicious process to detect any unauthorized data exfiltration or communication with known malicious IP addresses. +- Assess the system for any additional indicators of compromise, such as unexpected changes in system files or registry keys, which might suggest a broader attack. + +### False positive analysis + +- This behavior is very rare and should be highly suspicious. + +### Response and remediation + +- Isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further spread of the potential threat and to contain any malicious activity. +- Terminate the suspicious child process identified in the alert. +- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any additional malicious files or processes. +- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if the threat is part of a larger attack campaign. +- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for similar suspicious activities involving explorer.exe to enhance detection capabilities and prevent recurrence. +- Review and update endpoint security policies to restrict the execution of potentially malicious URL files.""" +references = [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/stealth-falcon-zero-day/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2025-33053", +] +risk_score = 73 +rule_id = "5e23495f-09e2-4484-8235-bdb150d698c9" +severity = "high" +tags = [ + "Domain: Endpoint", + "OS: Windows", + "Use Case: Threat Detection", + "Tactic: Initial Access", + "Tactic: Defense Evasion", + "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", + "Data Source: Elastic Defend", + "Data Source: Sysmon", + "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint", + "Data Source: SentinelOne", + "Resources: Investigation Guide", +] +timestamp_override = "event.ingested" +type = "eql" + +query = ''' +process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and + process.parent.executable : "C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iediagcmd.exe" and + process.name : ("route.exe", "netsh.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "dxdiag.exe", "conhost.exe", "makecab.exe") and + process.executable != null and + not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\route.exe", + "C:\\Windows\\System32\\netsh.exe", + "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ipconfig.exe", + "C:\\Windows\\System32\\dxdiag.exe", + "C:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe", + "C:\\Windows\\System32\\makecab.exe") +''' + + +[[rule.threat]] +framework = "MITRE ATT&CK" +[[rule.threat.technique]] +id = "T1566" +name = "Phishing" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/" +[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]] +id = "T1566.001" +name = "Spearphishing Attachment" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" + +[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]] +id = "T1566.002" +name = "Spearphishing Link" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/" + +[rule.threat.tactic] +id = "TA0001" +name = "Initial Access" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/" + + + + +[[rule.threat]] +framework = "MITRE ATT&CK" +[[rule.threat.technique]] +id = "T1218" +name = "System Binary Proxy Execution" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/" + + +[rule.threat.tactic] +id = "TA0005" +name = "Defense Evasion" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"