From 8427c8cd22074ab1687d64e49c9704aaebdde52a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 09:43:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Create credential_access_suspicious_lsass_access_generic.toml
 (#2487)

---
 ...ccess_suspicious_lsass_access_generic.toml | 69 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 rules/windows/credential_access_suspicious_lsass_access_generic.toml

diff --git a/rules/windows/credential_access_suspicious_lsass_access_generic.toml b/rules/windows/credential_access_suspicious_lsass_access_generic.toml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99364a3bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rules/windows/credential_access_suspicious_lsass_access_generic.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2023/01/22"
+integration = ["windows"]
+maturity = "production"
+min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
+min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
+updated_date = "2023/01/22"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump credentials from Lsass memory.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Suspicious Lsass Process Access"
+note = """## Setup
+If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
+"""
+references = ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "128468bf-cab1-4637-99ea-fdf3780a4609"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access", "Sysmon Only"]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where event.code == "10" and
+  winlog.event_data.TargetImage : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe" and
+  not winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess : 
+                ("0x1000", "0x1400", "0x101400", "0x101000", "0x101001", "0x100000", "0x100040", "0x3200", "0x40", "0x3200") and 
+  not process.name : ("procexp64.exe", "procmon.exe", "procexp.exe", "Microsoft.Identity.AadConnect.Health.AadSync.Host.ex") and 
+  not process.executable : 
+            ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsm.exe", 
+             "?:\\Program Files\\*", 
+             "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\system32\\csrss.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wininit.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\system32\\MRT.exe", 
+             "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\platform\\*", 
+             "?:\\ProgramData\\WebEx\\webex\\*", 
+             "?:\\Windows\\LTSvc\\LTSVC.exe") and 
+   not winlog.event_data.CallTrace : ("*mpengine.dll*", "*appresolver.dll*", "*sysmain.dll*") 
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1003"
+name = "OS Credential Dumping"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1003.001"
+name = "LSASS Memory"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"