From 7385f9dd2e71c76fae3f997bf210adee859e78a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2024 18:14:24 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] [Rule Tuning] 3rd Party EDR Compatibility - 16 (#4041)

* [Rule Tuning] 3rd Party EDR Compatibility - 16

* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.toml

* min_stack for merge, bump updated_date

---------

Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 .../persistence_webshell_detection.toml       | 16 +++---------
 .../persistence_werfault_reflectdebugger.toml | 14 +++++++---
 ...ilege_escalation_disable_uac_registry.toml | 23 ++++++++--------
 ...lege_escalation_exploit_cve_202238028.toml | 10 ++++---
 ...calation_gpo_schtask_service_creation.toml | 26 +++++++++----------
 ...privilege_escalation_lsa_auth_package.toml |  7 ++---
 ...e_escalation_named_pipe_impersonation.toml | 22 ++++++++--------
 ...ion_port_monitor_print_pocessor_abuse.toml |  7 ++---
 ...printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.toml | 24 +++++++----------
 ...tion_printspooler_suspicious_spl_file.toml |  7 ++---
 10 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)

diff --git a/rules/windows/persistence_webshell_detection.toml b/rules/windows/persistence_webshell_detection.toml
index 297e53966..d5b22ce24 100644
--- a/rules/windows/persistence_webshell_detection.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/persistence_webshell_detection.toml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2021/08/24"
-integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender"]
 maturity = "production"
 min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
 min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
-updated_date = "2024/08/07"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ false_positives = [
     """,
 ]
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*", "logs-system.security*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*", "logs-system.security*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Web Shell Detection: Script Process Child of Common Web Processes"
@@ -70,16 +70,8 @@ references = [
 ]
 risk_score = 73
 rule_id = "2917d495-59bd-4250-b395-c29409b76086"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
-events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
-Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
-`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
-For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
-"""
 severity = "high"
-tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Tactic: Initial Access", "Tactic: Execution", "Resources: Investigation Guide", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Data Source: SentinelOne", "Data Source: System"]
+tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Tactic: Initial Access", "Tactic: Execution", "Resources: Investigation Guide", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Data Source: SentinelOne", "Data Source: System", "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint", "Data Source: Sysmon"]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
 
diff --git a/rules/windows/persistence_werfault_reflectdebugger.toml b/rules/windows/persistence_werfault_reflectdebugger.toml
index fa3636187..05117130a 100644
--- a/rules/windows/persistence_werfault_reflectdebugger.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/persistence_werfault_reflectdebugger.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2023/08/29"
-integration = ["endpoint"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "windows"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/05/21"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
+min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
+min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -11,7 +13,7 @@ Identifies the registration of a Werfault Debugger. Attackers may abuse this mec
 every time the utility is executed with the "-pr" parameter.
 """
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*"]
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Werfault ReflectDebugger Persistence"
@@ -26,6 +28,9 @@ tags = [
     "Tactic: Persistence",
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
@@ -34,7 +39,8 @@ query = '''
 registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
   registry.path : (
     "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\Hangs\\ReflectDebugger",
-    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\Hangs\\ReflectDebugger"
+    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\Hangs\\ReflectDebugger",
+    "MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\Hangs\\ReflectDebugger"
   )
 '''
 
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_disable_uac_registry.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_disable_uac_registry.toml
index b42c758aa..67ed328f7 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_disable_uac_registry.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_disable_uac_registry.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2021/01/20"
-integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/09/23"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
+min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
+min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -13,7 +15,7 @@ administrator-level access to the system. This rule identifies registry value ch
 (UAC) protection.
 """
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification"
@@ -72,14 +74,6 @@ references = [
 ]
 risk_score = 47
 rule_id = "d31f183a-e5b1-451b-8534-ba62bca0b404"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
-events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
-Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
-`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
-For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
-"""
 severity = "medium"
 tags = [
     "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -90,6 +84,8 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
     "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
@@ -103,7 +99,10 @@ registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
       "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop",
       "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA",
       "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin",
-      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop"
+      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop",
+      "MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA",
+      "MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin",
+      "MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop"
     ) and
   registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")
 '''
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_exploit_cve_202238028.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_exploit_cve_202238028.toml
index 7d1c276ad..42c7e90aa 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_exploit_cve_202238028.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_exploit_cve_202238028.toml
@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2024/04/23"
-integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/08/22"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
+min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
+min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
 description = "Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via exploiting CVE-2022-38028 to hijack the print spooler service execution.\n"
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Potential privilege escalation via CVE-2022-38028"
@@ -27,6 +29,8 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
     "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_gpo_schtask_service_creation.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_gpo_schtask_service_creation.toml
index 6682a074f..cb729dc75 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_gpo_schtask_service_creation.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_gpo_schtask_service_creation.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2020/08/13"
-integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/05/31"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
+min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
+min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -12,20 +14,12 @@ legitimate system administration, but can also be abused by an attacker with dom
 malicious payload remotely on all or a subset of the domain joined machines.
 """
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Creation or Modification of a new GPO Scheduled Task or Service"
 risk_score = 21
 rule_id = "c0429aa8-9974-42da-bfb6-53a0a515a145"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
-events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
-Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
-`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
-For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
-"""
 severity = "low"
 tags = [
     "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -36,14 +30,18 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
     "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
 
 query = '''
-file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and
-  file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml",
-               "?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\Services\\Services.xml") and
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type != "deletion" and file.name : "ScheduledTasks.xml" and
+  file.path : (
+    "?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml",
+    "?:\\Windows\\SYSVOL\\domain\\Policies\\*\\MACHINE\\Preferences\\Services\\Services.xml"
+  ) and
   not process.name : "dfsrs.exe"
 '''
 
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_lsa_auth_package.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_lsa_auth_package.toml
index 2815d0320..73c5572df 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_lsa_auth_package.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_lsa_auth_package.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2021/01/21"
-integration = ["endpoint"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "m365_defender"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/05/21"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ privilege escalation or persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Wi
 executed by SYSTEM when the authentication packages are loaded.
 """
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*"]
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Potential LSA Authentication Package Abuse"
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ tags = [
     "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_named_pipe_impersonation.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_named_pipe_impersonation.toml
index 836c204c8..4cee3cfe1 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_named_pipe_impersonation.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_named_pipe_impersonation.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2020/11/23"
-integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/08/07"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
+min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
+min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
 
 [transform]
 [[transform.osquery]]
@@ -40,9 +42,12 @@ from = "now-9m"
 index = [
     "winlogbeat-*",
     "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
-    "logs-windows.*",
+    "logs-windows.forwarded*",
+    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
     "endgame-*",
     "logs-system.security*",
+    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
+    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
 ]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -104,14 +109,6 @@ references = [
 ]
 risk_score = 73
 rule_id = "3ecbdc9e-e4f2-43fa-8cca-63802125e582"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
-events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
-Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
-`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
-For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
-"""
 severity = "high"
 tags = [
     "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -122,6 +119,9 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
     "Data Source: System",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_port_monitor_print_pocessor_abuse.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_port_monitor_print_pocessor_abuse.toml
index 904d3df53..a7cba94a8 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_port_monitor_print_pocessor_abuse.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_port_monitor_print_pocessor_abuse.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2021/01/21"
-integration = ["endpoint"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "m365_defender"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/08/05"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot that will be executed as SYS
 persistence, if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL.
 """
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*"]
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Potential Port Monitor or Print Processor Registration Abuse"
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ tags = [
     "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.toml
index 8fee45cb7..6afb7943b 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2021/07/06"
-integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/05/21"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
+min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
+min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -17,21 +19,13 @@ false_positives = [
     """,
 ]
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Suspicious Print Spooler File Deletion"
 references = ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527"]
 risk_score = 47
 rule_id = "c4818812-d44f-47be-aaef-4cfb2f9cc799"
-setup = """## Setup
-
-If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
-events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
-Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
-`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
-For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
-"""
 severity = "medium"
 tags = [
     "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -42,14 +36,16 @@ tags = [
     "Use Case: Vulnerability",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
     "Data Source: Sysmon",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
+    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"
 
 query = '''
-file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : "deletion" and
- not process.name : ("spoolsv.exe", "dllhost.exe", "explorer.exe") and
- file.path : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\*.dll"
+file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "deletion" and
+  file.extension : "dll" and file.path : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\*.dll" and
+  not process.name : ("spoolsv.exe", "dllhost.exe", "explorer.exe")
 '''
 
 
diff --git a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_spl_file.toml b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_spl_file.toml
index 1d3dde578..38bf23888 100644
--- a/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_spl_file.toml
+++ b/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_spl_file.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 [metadata]
 creation_date = "2020/08/14"
-integration = ["endpoint"]
+integration = ["endpoint", "m365_defender"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/08/06"
+updated_date = "2024/10/10"
 
 [transform]
 [[transform.osquery]]
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the
 CVE-2020-1048 and CVE-2020-1337.
 """
 from = "now-9m"
-index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "endgame-*"]
+index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file-*", "endgame-*", "logs-m365_defender.event-*"]
 language = "eql"
 license = "Elastic License v2"
 name = "Suspicious Print Spooler SPL File Created"
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
     "Use Case: Vulnerability",
     "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
+    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "eql"