diff --git a/rules/windows/credential_access_mod_wdigest_security_provider.toml b/rules/windows/credential_access_mod_wdigest_security_provider.toml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0b5b337bb --- /dev/null +++ b/rules/windows/credential_access_mod_wdigest_security_provider.toml @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +[metadata] +creation_date = "2021/01/19" +maturity = "production" +updated_date = "2021/01/19" + +[rule] +author = ["Elastic"] +description = """ +Identifies attempts to modify the WDigest security provider in the registry to force the user's password to be stored in +clear text in memory. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken the security configuration of +an endpoint. Once the UseLogonCredential value is modified, the adversary may attempt to dump clear text passwords from +memory. +""" +from = "now-9m" +index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"] +language = "eql" +license = "Elastic License" +name = "Modification of WDigest Security Provider" +references = [ + "https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html", + "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/mitigating-mimikatz-wdigest-cleartext-credential-theft?edition=2019", +] +risk_score = 73 +rule_id = "d703a5af-d5b0-43bd-8ddb-7a5d500b7da5" +severity = "high" +tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access"] +type = "eql" + +query = ''' +registry where event.type in ("creation", "change") and + registry.path:"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\UseLogonCredential" and + registry.data.strings:"1" +''' + + +[[rule.threat]] +framework = "MITRE ATT&CK" +[[rule.threat.technique]] +id = "T1003" +name = "OS Credential Dumping" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/" +[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]] +id = "T1003.001" +name = "LSASS Memory" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/" + + + +[rule.threat.tactic] +id = "TA0006" +name = "Credential Access" +reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/" +