[Rule Tuning] Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries (#546)
* [Rule Tuning] Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries * replaced wildcard by in * indentation more consistent for readability * eql syntax * ecs_version
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@@ -11,17 +11,46 @@ adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt
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system.
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"""
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License"
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name = "Potential Modification of Accessibility Binaries"
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risk_score = 21
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references = ["https://www.elastic.co/blog/practical-security-engineering-stateful-detection"]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "7405ddf1-6c8e-41ce-818f-48bea6bcaed8"
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severity = "low"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
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type = "query"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and process.parent.name:winlogon.exe and not process.name:(atbroker.exe or displayswitch.exe or magnify.exe or narrator.exe or osk.exe or sethc.exe or utilman.exe)
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
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process.parent.name : ("Utilman.exe", "winlogon.exe") and user.name == "SYSTEM" and
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process.args :
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(
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"C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe",
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"C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe",
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"C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe",
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"C:\\Windows\\System32\\Sethc.exe",
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"utilman.exe",
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"ATBroker.exe",
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"DisplaySwitch.exe",
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"sethc.exe"
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)
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and not process.pe.original_file_name in
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(
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"osk.exe",
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"sethc.exe",
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"utilman2.exe",
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"DisplaySwitch.exe",
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"ATBroker.exe",
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"ScreenMagnifier.exe",
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"SR.exe",
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"Narrator.exe",
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"magnify.exe",
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"MAGNIFY.EXE"
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)
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/* uncomment once in winlogbeat to avoid bypass with rogue process with matching pe original file name */
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/* and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Windows" and process.code_signature.status == "trusted" */
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'''
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