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[New Rule] Rapid7 Threat Command CVEs Correlation (#3718)

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* new rule 'Rapid7 Threat Command CVEs Correlation'

* Update rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_rapid7_threat_command.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <16747370+brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* updated threat index and tags

* changed 'indicator match' to 'threat match' for tags

* removed timeline

* updating integrations to match main

* re-adding rapid7 threat command integration manifest and schema

* reverting changes; removing timeline

* changed max signals to 10000

---------

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <16747370+brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Terrance DeJesus
2024-06-12 18:01:44 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 4eff7c6c87
commit 020ca4be24
9 changed files with 123 additions and 9 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_indicator_match_address.toml
+187
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/05/22"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/06/10"
[transform]
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
query = """
SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
user_account == null)
"""
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
query = """
SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
"""
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match
against a network event.
"""
from = "now-65m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "endgame-*", "filebeat-*", "logs-*", "packetbeat-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against a network event.
> **Note**:
> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation so you can understand the nature of the connection. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field.
- Investigate the IP address, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
- Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Execute a reverse DNS lookup to retrieve hostnames associated with the given IP address.
- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- When a match is found, it's important to consider the indicator's initial release date. Threat intelligence is useful for augmenting existing security processes but can quickly become outdated. In other words, some threat intelligence only represents a specific set of activity observed at a specific time. For example, an IP address may have hosted malware observed in a Dridex campaign months ago, but it's possible that IP has been remediated and no longer represents any threat.
- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure.
- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/security/tip",
]
risk_score = 99
rule_id = "0c41e478-5263-4c69-8f9e-7dfd2c22da64"
setup = """## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration),
the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration),
or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
severity = "critical"
tags = ["OS: Windows", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Rule Type: Threat Match"]
threat_index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-ti_*"]
threat_indicator_path = "threat.indicator"
threat_language = "kuery"
threat_query = """
@timestamp >= "now-30d/d" and event.module:(threatintel or ti_*) and threat.indicator.ip:* and not
labels.is_ioc_transform_source:"true"
"""
timeline_id = "495ad7a7-316e-4544-8a0f-9c098daee76e"
timeline_title = "Generic Threat Match Timeline"
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "threat_match"
query = '''
source.ip:* or destination.ip:*
'''
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.category"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "threat"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.category" = "threat"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.kind"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "enrichment"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.kind" = "enrichment"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.type"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "indicator"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.type" = "indicator"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "source.ip"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.ip"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "destination.ip"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.ip"
rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_indicator_match_hash.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/05/22"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/06/10"
[transform]
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
query = """
SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
user_account == null)
"""
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
query = """
SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
"""
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against
an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events.
"""
from = "now-65m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "endgame-*", "filebeat-*", "logs-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or an indicator ingested from a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, file operation events, etc.
> **Note**:
> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field.
- Investigate the hash , which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
- Search for the existence and reputation of the hash in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Scope other potentially compromised hosts in your environment by mapping hosts with file operations involving the same hash.
- Identify the process that created the file.
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Enrich the information that you have right now by determining how the file was dropped, where it was downloaded from, etc. This can help you determine if the event is part of an ongoing campaign against the organization.
- Retrieve the involved file and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- Adversaries often use legitimate tools as network administrators, such as `PsExec` or `AdFind`. These tools are often included in indicator lists, which creates the potential for false positives.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/security/tip",
]
risk_score = 99
rule_id = "aab184d3-72b3-4639-b242-6597c99d8bca"
setup = """## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration),
the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration),
or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
severity = "critical"
tags = ["OS: Windows", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Rule Type: Threat Match"]
threat_index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-ti_*"]
threat_indicator_path = "threat.indicator"
threat_language = "kuery"
threat_query = """
@timestamp >= "now-30d/d" and event.module:(threatintel or ti_*) and (threat.indicator.file.hash.*:* or
threat.indicator.file.pe.imphash:*) and not labels.is_ioc_transform_source:"true"
"""
timeline_id = "495ad7a7-316e-4544-8a0f-9c098daee76e"
timeline_title = "Generic Threat Match Timeline"
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "threat_match"
query = '''
file.hash.*:* or process.hash.*:* or dll.hash.*:*
'''
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.category"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "threat"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.category" = "threat"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.kind"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "enrichment"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.kind" = "enrichment"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.type"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "indicator"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.type" = "indicator"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "file.hash.md5"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.md5"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "file.hash.sha1"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.sha1"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "file.hash.sha256"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.sha256"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "dll.hash.md5"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.md5"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "dll.hash.sha1"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.sha1"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "dll.hash.sha256"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.sha256"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "process.hash.md5"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.md5"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "process.hash.sha1"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.sha1"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "process.hash.sha256"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.file.hash.sha256"
rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_indicator_match_registry.toml
+174
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@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/05/22"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/06/10"
[transform]
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
query = """
SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
user_account == null)
"""
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
query = """
SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
"""
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a
match against an event that contains registry data.
"""
from = "now-65m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "endgame-*", "filebeat-*", "logs-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains registry data.
> **Note**:
> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Check related threat reports to gain context about the registry indicator of compromise (IoC) and to understand if it's a system-native mechanism abused for persistence, to store data, to disable security mechanisms, etc. Use this information to define the appropriate triage and respond steps.
- Identify the process responsible for the registry operation and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- Adversaries can leverage dual-use registry mechanisms that are commonly used by normal applications. These registry keys can be added into indicator lists creating the potential for false positives.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/security/tip",
]
risk_score = 99
rule_id = "a61809f3-fb5b-465c-8bff-23a8a068ac60"
setup = """## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration),
the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration),
or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
severity = "critical"
tags = ["OS: Windows", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Rule Type: Threat Match"]
threat_index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-ti_*"]
threat_indicator_path = "threat.indicator"
threat_language = "kuery"
threat_query = """
@timestamp >= "now-30d/d" and event.module:(threatintel or ti_*) and threat.indicator.registry.path:* and not
labels.is_ioc_transform_source:"true"
"""
timeline_id = "495ad7a7-316e-4544-8a0f-9c098daee76e"
timeline_title = "Generic Threat Match Timeline"
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "threat_match"
query = '''
registry.path:*
'''
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.category"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "threat"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.category" = "threat"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.kind"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "enrichment"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.kind" = "enrichment"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.type"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "indicator"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.type" = "indicator"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "registry.path"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.registry.path"
rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_indicator_match_url.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/05/22"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/06/10"
[transform]
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
query = """
SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
user_account == null)
"""
[[transform.osquery]]
label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
query = """
SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
"""
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an
event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc.
"""
from = "now-65m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "endgame-*", "filebeat-*", "logs-*", "packetbeat-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel URL Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel URL Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc.
> **Note**:
> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Investigate the URL, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
- Identify the type of malicious activity related to the URL (phishing, malware, etc.).
- Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Execute a WHOIS lookup to retrieve information about the domain registration and contacts to report abuse.
- If dealing with a phishing incident:
- Contact the user to gain more information around the delivery method, information sent, etc.
- Analyze whether the URL is trying to impersonate a legitimate address. Look for typosquatting, extra or unusual subdomains, or other anomalies that could lure the user.
- Investigate the phishing page to identify which information may have been sent to the attacker by the user.
- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure.
- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Consider reporting the address for abuse using the provided contact information.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/security/tip",
]
risk_score = 99
rule_id = "f3e22c8b-ea47-45d1-b502-b57b6de950b3"
setup = """## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration),
the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration),
or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
severity = "critical"
tags = ["OS: Windows", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Rule Type: Threat Match"]
threat_index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-ti_*"]
threat_indicator_path = "threat.indicator"
threat_language = "kuery"
threat_query = """
@timestamp >= "now-30d/d" and event.module:(threatintel or ti_*) and threat.indicator.url.full:* and not
labels.is_ioc_transform_source:"true"
"""
timeline_id = "495ad7a7-316e-4544-8a0f-9c098daee76e"
timeline_title = "Generic Threat Match Timeline"
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "threat_match"
query = '''
url.full:*
'''
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.category"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "threat"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.category" = "threat"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.kind"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "enrichment"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.kind" = "enrichment"
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "event.type"
negate = false
type = "phrase"
[rule.threat_filters.meta.params]
query = "indicator"
[rule.threat_filters.query.match_phrase]
"event.type" = "indicator"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "url.full"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.url.full"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "url.original"
type = "mapping"
value = "threat.indicator.url.original"
rules/threat_intel/threat_intel_rapid7_threat_command.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/05/29"
integration = ["ti_rapid7_threat_command"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/06/12"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule is triggered when CVEs collected from the Rapid7 Threat Command Integration have a match against
vulnerabilities that were found in the customer environment.
"""
from = "now-35m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "endgame-*", "filebeat-*", "logs-*", "packetbeat-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
interval = "30m"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
max_signals = 10000
name = "Rapid7 Threat Command CVEs Correlation"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Rapid7 Threat Command CVEs Correlation
Rapid7 Threat Command CVEs Correlation rule allows matching CVEs from user indices within the vulnerabilities collected from Rapid7 Threat Command integrations.
The matches will be based on the latest values of CVEs from the last 180 days. So it's essential to validate the data and review the results by investigating the associated activity to determine if it requires further investigation.
If a vulnerability matches a local observation, the following enriched fields will be generated to identify the vulnerability, field, and type matched.
- `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` - this identifies the atomic vulnerability that matched the local observation
- `threat.indicator.matched.field` - this identifies the vulnerability field that matched the local observation
- `threat.indicator.matched.type` - this identifies the vulnerability type that matched the local observation
Additional investigation can be done by reviewing the source of the activity and considering the history of the vulnerability that was matched. This can help understand if the activity is related to legitimate behavior.
- Investigation can be validated and reviewed based on the data that was matched and by viewing the source of that activity.
- Consider the history of the vulnerability that was matched. Has it happened before? Is it happening on multiple machines? These kinds of questions can help understand if the activity is related to legitimate behavior.
- Consider the user and their role within the company: is this something related to their job or work function?
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/ti_rapid7_threat_command"]
risk_score = 99
rule_id = "3a657da0-1df2-11ef-a327-f661ea17fbcc"
setup = """
## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work.
Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration),
the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration),
or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
## Max Signals
This rule is configured to generate more **Max alerts per run** than the default 1000 alerts per run set for all rules. This is to ensure that it captures as many alerts as possible.
**IMPORTANT:** The rule's **Max alerts per run** setting can be superseded by the `xpack.alerting.rules.run.alerts.max` Kibana config setting, which determines the maximum alerts generated by _any_ rule in the Kibana alerting framework. For example, if `xpack.alerting.rules.run.alerts.max` is set to 1000, this rule will still generate no more than 1000 alerts even if its own **Max alerts per run** is set higher.
To make sure this rule can generate as many alerts as it's configured in its own **Max alerts per run** setting, increase the `xpack.alerting.rules.run.alerts.max` system setting accordingly.
**NOTE:** Changing `xpack.alerting.rules.run.alerts.max` is not possible in Serverless projects.
"""
severity = "critical"
tags = [
"OS: Windows",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Windows",
"Data Source: Network",
"Data Source: Rapid7 Threat Command",
"Rule Type: Threat Match",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Use Case: Vulnerability",
"Use Case: Asset Visibility",
"Use Case: Continuous Monitoring",
]
threat_index = ["logs-ti_rapid7_threat_command_latest.ioc"]
threat_indicator_path = "rapid7.tc.vulnerability"
threat_language = "kuery"
threat_query = """
@timestamp >= "now-30d/d" and vulnerability.id : * and event.module: ti_rapid7_threat_command
"""
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "threat_match"
query = '''
vulnerability.id : *
'''
[[rule.threat_filters]]
[rule.threat_filters."$state"]
store = "appState"
[rule.threat_filters.meta]
disabled = false
key = "rapid7.tc.vulnerability.id"
negate = true
type = "exists"
[rule.threat_filters.query.exists]
field = "rapid7.tc.vulnerability.id"
[[rule.threat_mapping]]
[[rule.threat_mapping.entries]]
field = "vulnerability.id"
type = "mapping"
value = "vulnerability.id"