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[ metadata ]
creation_date = "2020/10/30"
maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/08/02"
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[ rule ]
author = [ "Elastic" ]
description = "" "
Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This may be abused by adversaries to hide
malware in trusted paths.
" ""
from = "now-9m"
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index = [ "winlogbeat-*" , "logs-endpoint.events.*" , "logs-windows.*" ]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line"
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note = "" "## Triage and analysis
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This is related to the `Process Execution from an Unusual Directory rule`.
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## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
" ""
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risk_score = 47
rule_id = "cff92c41-2225-4763-b4ce-6f71e5bda5e6"
severity = "medium"
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tags = [ "Elastic" , "Host" , "Windows" , "Threat Detection" , "Execution" , "Defense Evasion" ]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
query = '' '
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
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process.name : ("wscript.exe",
"cscript.exe",
"rundll32.exe",
"regsvr32.exe",
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"cmstp.exe",
"RegAsm.exe",
"installutil.exe",
"mshta.exe",
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"RegSvcs.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"pwsh.exe",
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"cmd.exe") and
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/* add suspicious execution paths here */
process.args : ("C:\\PerfLogs\\*",
"C:\\Users\\Public\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*",
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"C:\\Intel\\*",
"C:\\AMD\\Temp\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\AppReadiness\\*",
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"C:\\Windows\\ServiceState\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\security\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\IdentityCRL\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Branding\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\csc\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\DigitalLocker\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\en-US\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\wlansvc\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\diagnostics\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\INF\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\Speech\\*",
"C:\\windows\\tracing\\*",
"c:\\windows\\IME\\*",
"c:\\Windows\\Performance\\*",
"c:\\windows\\intel\\*",
"c:\\windows\\ms\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\dot3svc\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\panther\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\RemotePackages\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\OCR\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\addins\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Setup\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Help\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\SKB\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Vss\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\CbsTemp\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Logs\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\WaaS\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\twain_32\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ShellExperiences\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ShellComponents\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\PLA\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Migration\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Containers\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Boot\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\bcastdvr\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\TextInput\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\security\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\schemas\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\SchCache\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Resources\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\rescache\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\PrintDialog\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\PolicyDefinitions\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\media\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Globalization\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\L2Schemas\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\LiveKernelReports\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ModemLogs\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*",
"C:\\$Recycle.Bin\\*") and
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/* noisy FP patterns */
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not process.parent.executable : ("C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*\\igfxCUIService*.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\spacedeskService.exe",
"C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SupportAssistAgent\\SRE\\SRE.exe") and
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not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
process.args : ("uxtheme.dll,#64",
"PRINTUI.DLL,PrintUIEntry",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\FirewallControlPanel.dll,ShowNotificationDialog",
"?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\Speech\\SpeechUX\\sapi.cpl",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\shell32.dll,OpenAs_RunDLL")) and
not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\calluxxprovider.vbs") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\powercfg.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\inf\\PowerPlan.log") and
not (process.name : "regsvr32.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Windows\\Help\\OEM\\scripts\\checkmui.dll") and
not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and
process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\oobe\\windeploy.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ossec-agent\\wazuh-agent.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\igfxCUIService.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\Temp\\IE*.tmp\\IE*-support\\ienrcore.exe"))
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' ''
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[ [ rule . threat ] ]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[ [ rule . threat . technique ] ]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[ rule . threat . tactic ]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[ [ rule . threat ] ]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[ [ rule . threat . technique ] ]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[ [ rule . threat . technique . subtechnique ] ]
id = "T1036.005"
name = "Match Legitimate Name or Location"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/"
[ rule . threat . tactic ]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"