sigma-rules/rules/windows/execution_suspicious_cmd_wmi.toml

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/10/19"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/02/22"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could
be indicative of adversary lateral movement.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI"
note = """## Setup

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "12f07955-1674-44f7-86b5-c35da0a6f41a"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution", "Elastic Endgame"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
 process.args : "\\\\127.0.0.1\\*" and process.args : ("2>&1", "1>")
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1047"
name = "Windows Management Instrumentation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"