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[ metadata ]
creation_date = "2020/10/19"
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integration = [ "endpoint" , "windows" ]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/02/22"
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[ rule ]
author = [ "Elastic" ]
description = "Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code."
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false_positives = [ "Microsoft Windows installers leveraging RunDLL32 for installation." ]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = [ "winlogbeat-*" , "logs-endpoint.events.*" , "logs-windows.*" , "endgame-*" ]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32"
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note = "" "## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
" ""
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risk_score = 21
rule_id = "9ccf3ce0-0057-440a-91f5-870c6ad39093"
severity = "low"
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tags = [ "Elastic" , "Host" , "Windows" , "Threat Detection" , "Execution" , "Credential Access" , "Elastic Endgame" ]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
query = '' '
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and
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process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.command_line != null and
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/* common FPs can be added here */
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not process.parent.args : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll,RunAsNewUser_RunDLL",
"C:\\WINDOWS\\*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc")
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' ''
[ [ rule . threat ] ]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[ [ rule . threat . technique ] ]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[ [ rule . threat . technique . subtechnique ] ]
id = "T1059.001"
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name = "PowerShell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
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[ [ rule . threat . technique . subtechnique ] ]
id = "T1059.003"
name = "Windows Command Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"
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[ rule . threat . tactic ]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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[ [ rule . threat ] ]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[ [ rule . threat . technique ] ]
id = "T1552"
name = "Unsecured Credentials"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
[ rule . threat . tactic ]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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