sigma-rules/rules/windows/execution_via_hidden_shell_conhost.toml

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/08/17"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2022/03/31"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspicious parent process, which could be
indicative of code injection.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process"
note = """## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
references = [
    "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-one.html",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "05b358de-aa6d-4f6c-89e6-78f74018b43b"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
  process.name : "conhost.exe" and
  process.parent.name : ("svchost.exe", "lsass.exe", "services.exe", "smss.exe", "winlogon.exe", "explorer.exe",
                         "dllhost.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "userinit.exe", "wininit.exe", "spoolsv.exe",
                         "wermgr.exe", "csrss.exe", "ctfmon.exe")
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"