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blue-team-tools/rules/windows/builtin/wmi/win_wmi_persistence.yml
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title: WMI Persistence
id: 0b7889b4-5577-4521-a60a-3376ee7f9f7b
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.
author: Florian Roth, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin oscd.community
date: 2017/08/22
modified: 2022/02/10
references:
- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397
- https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1546.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: wmi #native windows detection
definition: 'WMI Namespaces Auditing and SACL should be configured, EventID 5861 and 5859 detection requires Windows 10, 2012 and higher'
detection:
wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding:
EventID: 5861
consumer_keywords:
- 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
- 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
- 'CommandLineTemplate'
# - 'Binding EventFilter' # too many false positive with HP Health Driver
wmi_filter_registration:
EventID: 5859
filter_scmevent:
Provider: 'SCM Event Provider'
Query: 'select * from MSFT_SCMEventLogEvent'
User: 'S-1-5-32-544'
PossibleCause: 'Permanent'
condition: ( (wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding and consumer_keywords) or (wmi_filter_registration) ) and not filter_scmevent
falsepositives:
- Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)
level: medium