Files
blue-team-tools/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_susp_certutil_command.yml
T
Karneades c73a9e4164 Fix CommandLine in rule sysmon/sysmon_susp_certutil_command
Below is an example of a test - the command line does not
include the path nor the .exe. I think this comes from the
initial detection on the Image path and the later switch to
command line.

We could also use both the Image path and the Command Line.

Message     : Process Create:
              Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\certutil.exe
              CommandLine: certutil  xx -decode xxx
              Hashes: SHA1=8186D64DD28CD63CA883B1D3CE5F07AEABAD67C0
              ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
              ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"
2018-09-23 20:28:56 +02:00

38 lines
1.2 KiB
YAML

title: Suspicious Certutil Command
status: experimental
description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft certutil execution with sub commands like 'decode' sub command, which is sometimes used to decode malicious code with the built-in certutil utility
author: Florian Roth, juju4
references:
- https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680
- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/888102593838362624
- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/888071631528235010
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/pki/2006/11/30/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil/
- https://www.trustedsec.com/2017/07/new-tool-release-nps_payload/
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
CommandLine:
- '*certutil * -decode *'
- '*certutil * -decodehex *'
- '*certutil *-urlcache* http*'
- '*certutil *-urlcache* ftp*'
- '*certutil *-URL*'
- '*certutil *-ping*'
condition: selection
fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentCommandLine
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.s0189
- attack.g0007
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high