Nasreddine Bencherchali
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fix: Kerberos Manipulation - Update field to use Status instead of incorrect "FailureCode" fix: Metasploit SMB Authentication - Remove unnecessary field fix: Service Installation in Suspicious Folder - Update FP filter update: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation - "Start-Dnscat2" remove: Dnscat Execution - Deprecated in favour of an integration in the "Malicious PowerShell Cmdlet" type of rules remove: SAM Dump to AppData update: Critical Hive In Suspicious Location Access Bits Cleared - Enhance metadata and logic update: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - PoshModule - "Start-Dnscat2" update: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock - "Start-Dnscat2" update: Malicious PowerShell Scripts - FileCreation - Add "dnscat2.ps1" update: Malicious PowerShell Scripts - PoshModule - Add "dnscat2.ps1" update: Monitoring For Persistence Via BITS - Use "Image" and "OriginalFileName" fields instead of CLI only update: New or Renamed User Account with '$' Character - Reduced level to "medium" update: New Process Created Via Taskmgr.EXE - Added full paths to the filtered binaries to decrease false negatives update: Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript - Re-wrote the logic by removing the paths "C:\Users" and "C:\ProgramData". As these are very common and will generate high FP rate. Instead switched the paths to a more robust list and extended the list of extension covered. Also reduced the level to "medium" update: Potential Fake Instance Of Hxtsr.EXE Executed - Remove "C:" prefix from detection logic update: Prefetch File Deleted - Update selection to remove 'C:' prefix update: Sensitive File Access Via Volume Shadow Copy Backup - Made the rule more generic by updating the title and removing the IOC from conti. (will be added in a dedicated rule) update: Shell Process Spawned by Java.EXE - Add "bash.exe" update: Suspicious PowerShell Download - Powershell Script - Add "DownloadFileAsync" and "DownloadStringAsync" functions update: Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE - Remove "bash.exe" as its doesn't fit the logic update: Sysmon Application Crashed - Add 32bit version of sysmon binary update: Tap Driver Installation - Security - Reduce level to "low" update: Write Protect For Storage Disabled - Remove "storagedevicepolicies" as the string "storage" already covers it --------- Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>
31 lines
1.1 KiB
YAML
31 lines
1.1 KiB
YAML
title: Tap Installer Execution
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id: 99793437-3e16-439b-be0f-078782cf953d
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status: test
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description: Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration using tunneling techniques
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references:
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- https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/ManagingWindowsTAPDrivers
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author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community
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date: 2019/10/24
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modified: 2023/12/11
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tags:
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- attack.exfiltration
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- attack.t1048
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logsource:
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category: process_creation
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product: windows
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detection:
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selection:
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Image|endswith: '\tapinstall.exe'
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filter_optional_avast:
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Image|contains:
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- ':\Program Files\Avast Software\SecureLine VPN\'
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- ':\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\SecureLine VPN\'
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filter_optional_openvpn:
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Image|contains: ':\Program Files\OpenVPN Connect\drivers\tap\'
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filter_optional_protonvpn:
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Image|contains: ':\Program Files (x86)\Proton Technologies\ProtonVPNTap\installer\'
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condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
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falsepositives:
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- Legitimate OpenVPN TAP installation
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level: medium
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