Nasreddine Bencherchali
e052677142
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fix: Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Application - Enhance FP filters fix: Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Application - Enhance FP filters fix: Amsi.DLL Load By Uncommon Process - Moved to threat hunting folder and update false positive filters to remove hardcoded C: fix: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments - Typo in condition fix: Credential Manager Access By Uncommon Application - Enhance FP filters fix: Elevated System Shell Spawned From Uncommon Parent Location - Enhance FP filters fix: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension - Add new extensions to reduce FP fix: Important Windows Eventlog Cleared - Update selection to remove "Application" log as it was generating a lot of FP in some environments fix: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock - Remove some part of the selection due to FP matches as they were generic cmdlet names fix: Potential Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess - Add "Adobe" filter fix: Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE - Update FP filter for "iisexpressshim" sdb fix: Potentially Suspicious AccessMask Requested From LSASS - Add new FP filter for "procmon" process fix: PowerView PowerShell Cmdlets - ScriptBlock - Remove some part of the selection due to FP matches as they were generic cmdlet names fix: PSScriptPolicyTest Creation By Uncommon Process - Add new filter for "sdiagnhost" fix: Relevant Anti-Virus Signature Keywords In Application Log - Update false positive filters fix: Remote Access Tool Services Have Been Installed - Security - Fix typo in field name fix: Suspicious File Creation Activity From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder - Remove RECYCLE.BIN\ as it was added as a typo and is a legitimate location. fix: Uncommon Child Process Of Conhost.EXE - Add new FP filters fix: Uncommon File Created In Office Startup Folder - Add new extension to filter out FP generated with MS Access databases fix: Uncommon PowerShell Hosts - Moved to threat hunting folder and updated false positive filter list fix: Use Of Remove-Item to Delete File - ScriptBlock - Moved to threat hunting folder and Update logic to be more accurate fix: User with Privileges Logon - Move to placeholder rules and update the FP filter to account for different workstations fix: Windows Event Auditing Disabled - Enhance list of false positive filters with additional GUID fix: WMI Module Loaded By Uncommon Process - Moved to threat hunting folder and update and restructure false positive filters new: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports new: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs With Uncommon Extension remove: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution remove: New Service Uses Double Ampersand in Path remove: Powershell File and Directory Discovery remove: PowerShell Scripts Run by a Services remove: Security Event Log Cleared remove: Suspicious Get-WmiObject remove: Windows Defender Threat Detection Disabled update: Access To Browser Credential Files By Uncommon Application - Increase level to medium and enhance filters and selections update: Add Potential Suspicious New Download Source To Winget - Reduce level to medium update: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool - Enhance coverage by improving paths selection update: CodeIntegrity - Unmet Signing Level Requirements By File Under Validation - Reduce level to low update: Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder - Enhance selection to be more accurate update: Eventlog Cleared - Update FP filter to remove "Application" log and increase coverage update: Failed Code Integrity Checks - Reduce level to informational update: HH.EXE Execution - Reduce level to low update: Locked Workstation - Reduce level to informational update: Malicious Driver Load By Name - Increase coverage based on LOLDrivers data update: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security - Reduce level to high and restructure selections update: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System - Reduce level to high and restructure selections update: Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS - Reduce level to medium and comment out noisy access masks update: Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering - Remove "RemoteSigned" as it doesn't fit with the current logic update: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location - Reduce level to medium and update logic update: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication - Increase coverage by adding new additional ports update: PUA - Nmap/Zenmap Execution - Reduce level to medium update: PUA - Process Hacker Execution - Reduce level to medium update: PUA - Radmin Viewer Utility Execution - Reduce level to medium update: Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension - Enhance DLL extension list update: SASS Access From Non System Account - Reduce level to medium and enhance false positive filters update: Suspicious Executable File Creation - Enhance coverage by removing hardocded "C:" update: Suspicious Program Location with Network Connections - Increase accuracy by enhancing the selection to focus on the start of the folder and partition update: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder - Reduce level to medium update: Suspicious Shim Database Patching Activity - Add new processes to increase coverage update: Uncommon Extension Shim Database Installation Via Sdbinst.EXE - Reduce level to medium update: Whoami Utility Execution - Reduce level to low update: Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option - Reduce level to medium update: Windows Defender Malware Detection History Deletion - Reduce level to informational update: WMI Event Consumer Created Named Pipe - Reduce leve to medium --------- Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com> Thanks: @Blackmore-Robert Thanks: @swachchhanda000 Thanks: @celalettin-turgut Thanks: @AaronS97
28 lines
1.4 KiB
YAML
28 lines
1.4 KiB
YAML
title: New PowerShell Instance Created
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id: ac7102b4-9e1e-4802-9b4f-17c5524c015c
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related:
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- id: 58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a
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type: derived
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status: test
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description: Detects the execution of PowerShell via the creation of a named pipe starting with PSHost
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references:
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- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html
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- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190410-LocalPwshExecution/notebook.html
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author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
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date: 2019/09/12
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modified: 2023/11/30
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tags:
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- attack.execution
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- attack.t1059.001
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logsource:
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product: windows
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category: pipe_created
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definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
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detection:
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selection:
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PipeName|startswith: '\PSHost'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Likely
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level: informational
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