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blue-team-tools/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_attached_malicious_lambda_layer.yml
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Nasreddine Bencherchali 598d29f811 Merge PR #4950 from @nasbench - Comply With v2 Spec Changes
chore: change tags, date, modified fields to comply with v2 of the Sigma spec.
chore: update the related type from `obsoletes` to `obsolete`.
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YAML

title: AWS Attached Malicious Lambda Layer
id: 97fbabf8-8e1b-47a2-b7d5-a418d2b95e3d
status: test
description: |
Detects when an user attached a Lambda layer to an existing function to override a library that is in use by the function, where their malicious code could utilize the function's IAM role for AWS API calls.
This would give an adversary access to the privileges associated with the Lambda service role that is attached to that function.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/API_UpdateFunctionConfiguration.html
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-09-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: lambda.amazonaws.com
eventName|startswith: 'UpdateFunctionConfiguration'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Lambda Layer being attached may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
- Lambda Layer being attached from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium