title: Credentials Dumping Tools Accessing LSASS Memory id: 32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d status: experimental description: Detects process access LSASS memory which is typical for credentials dumping tools author: Florian Roth, Roberto Rodriguez, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Thomas Patzke, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Sherif Eldeeb, James Dickenson, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update) date: 2017/02/16 modified: 2021/05/16 references: - https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow - https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf tags: - attack.credential_access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1003 # an old one - attack.s0002 - car.2019-04-004 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' GrantedAccess|contains: - '0x40' - '0x1000' - '0x1400' - '0x100000' - '0x1410' # car.2019-04-004 - '0x1010' # car.2019-04-004 - '0x1438' # car.2019-04-004 - '0x143a' # car.2019-04-004 - '0x1418' # car.2019-04-004 - '0x1f0fff' - '0x1f1fff' - '0x1f2fff' - '0x1f3fff' filter: ProcessName|endswith: # easy to bypass. need to implement supportive rule to detect bypass attempts - '\wmiprvse.exe' - '\taskmgr.exe' - '\procexp64.exe' - '\procexp.exe' - '\lsm.exe' - '\MsMpEng.exe' - '\csrss.exe' - '\wininit.exe' - '\vmtoolsd.exe' condition: selection and not filter fields: - ComputerName - User - SourceImage falsepositives: - Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason; update the whitelist with it level: high